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BIFURCATION UNBOUND
Steven S. Gensler*
Abstract: The bifurcation of issues in a federal trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(b) offers many benefits for both litigants and the judiciary. One of the greatest potential
benefits of issue bifurcation is increased judicial efficiency. Frequently the jury's disposition of
the first issue will obviate the need to try the remaining issues. Despite this efficiency potential,
bifurcation is controversial. Historically, the opponents of bifurcation have leveled three primary
criticisms against bifurcation: (1) that it skews verdict outcomes in favor of defendants, (2) that it
infringes on the role of the civil jury, and (3) that it creates a sterile and unnatural trial
atmosphere. The critics have carried the day with a majority of federal judges, who employ a
presumption against issue bifurcation and bifurcate infrequently. This Article scrutinizes the
reasons underlying the presumption against issue bifurcation and concludes that the presumption
is unjustified. Accordingly, this Article proposes changes to Rule 42(b) that would eliminate the
presumption against issue bifurcation and communicate to federal judges two important
messages: (1) bifurcation is not antithetical to the role of the civil jury or justice, and (2) in the
long run, analyzing each case to identify issues to try separately should improve judicial
efficiency.
Since 1938 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) has authorized federal
judges to try issues separately-a procedure commonly known as
bifurcation.' In its most familiar form, the issues of liability and damages
are tried separately, with the jury usually hearing and deciding liability
first.2 But bifurcation comes in many other shapes and sizes Judges have
* VisitingAssistant ProfessorofLaw, University of Illinois, 1999-2000; Associate Professor ofLaw,
University of Oklahoma. Jim Pfander, Tom Mengler, Rick Marcus, and Tom Ulen provided extremely
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Susan Lauer provided indispensable research assistance.
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Separate Trials. The Court, in furtherance of convenience orto avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may ordera separate trial of any claim ... orof
any separate issue... always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The term "bifurcation" means to divide into parts and is "widely used to describe
the separation of claims or issues pursuant to Rule 42(b)." 8 James Win. Moore et al., Moore's Federal
Practice § 42.20(3) (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Moore's Federal Practice]. An analogous practice is
available in class actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) ("When appropriate... an action may be brought
or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.").
2. See 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2390 (3d ed.
1995) [hereinafter Federal Practice and Procedure]; Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1,
§ 42.20(6)(b). Occasionally the trial is "reverse bifurcated," with the jury deciding damages first. In
asbestos litigation, for example, it is common for the first phase to reserve liability and try damages first
because the damages issue is the most contentious. See Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d
957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993).
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used Rule 42(b) to separate the trial of discrete issues, such as affirmative
defenses4 or punitive damages.' The flexibility of Rule 42(b) has allowed
judges to divide the trial into three or more separate parts.' Given the
variety of cases within the federal docket, the potential for federal judges to
find new and imaginative ways to bifurcate is enormous.7
On the surface, issue bifurcation promises a substantial potential for trial
efficiency. In a unitary trial, the jury hears all of the evidence and decides
all of the issues at the same time.9 In the large share of those cases where
the jury finds for the defendant on liability,'" however, all of the trial time
spent presenting evidence on damages has been wasted." Bifurcation also
saves trial time even in cases where the plaintiff prevails on liability
because the parties will often settle instead of proceeding with the damages
stage.2 In either way, bifurcation can substantially shorten many of the
3. As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, "there is no rule that ifa trial is bifurcated, it must be
bifurcated between liability and damages. The judge can bifurcate (or for that matter trifurcate, or slice
even more finely) a case at whatever point will minimize the overlap in evidence between the segmented
phases or otherwise promote economy and accuracy in adjudication." Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet
Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1995).
4. See infra note 134.
5. See infra note 136.
6. The use of trifurcation and polyfurcation has become increasingly common in complex litigation.
See Albert P. Bedecarr6, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurcation of Liability Issues in
Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aft. L. Rev. 123, 138-47 (1989).
7. See Stephan Landsman et al., Be Carefil What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects of
Bfifrcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 300 ("Rule 42(b) makes it possible
for a judge to divide a lawsuit in virtually any conceivable way.").
8. See id. Besides promoting expedition and efficiency, the text of Rule 42(b) suggests two further
potential benefits that might result from trying issues separately: eliminating prejudice and furthering
convenience to the court and litigants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see generally 9 Federal Practice and
Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388.
9. See Landsman et al, supra note 7, at 377 ("[I]n a unitary trial, a jury makes one decision, after
hearing all the evidence."); James A. Henderson, Jr. et al., Optimal Issue Separation in Modern Products
Liability Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1653, 1675 (1995); Lewis Mayers, The Severance for Trial of
Liabilityfrom Damage, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 389, 389-90 (1938).
10. See Mayers, supra note 9, at 390.
11. The waste would be even greater in situations where the jury found for the defendant on an
affirmative defense, or where the case had been trifurcated and the defendant prevailed on the
preliminary issue of causation. In In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), for example,
the jury's decision that the drug Bendectin did not cause birth defects obviated the need to try specific
causation and damages individually in any of the 844 cases that were a part of those consolidated
proceedings. Id. at 293.
12. See Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 1606, 1607-08 (1963).
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cases currently being tried in full in the federal courts. 3 For example,
suppose that defendants win 50% of the cases that are tried 4 and that
another 20% settle after a liability verdict for the plaintiff.5 If all trials were
bifurcated between liability and damages stages, 70% would end without
reaching the damages phase. Assuming the damages evidence takes up one-
third of the average trial, bifurcation of liability and damages alone would
cut the overall amount of trial time in the federal courts by 23%.16
Given the modem emphasis on judicial management and efficiency in
the federal courts,'7 one might expect bifurcation to be commonplace. Yet
bifurcation is not common in the federal courts, nor has it ever been. When
Rule 42(b) first took effect in 1938, the federal judiciary took a cautious,
almost grudging approach to this new procedural tool'8 and used it only in
13. "If a single issue could be dispositive of the case or is likely to lead the parties to negotiate a
settlement, and resolution of it might make it unnecessary to try the other issues in the litigation, separate
trial of that issue may be desirable to save the time of the court and reduce the expenses of the parties." 9
Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388, at 476; see also 8 Moore's Federal Practice,
supra note 1, § 42.20(6)(a) ("Resolution of a key issue may determine the outcome of an entire
proceeding.").
14. Current best estimates are that cases that go to trial are close cases and therefore yield roughly 50-
50 win rates. Priest and Klein first predicted (and empirically demonstrated) that plaintiffs and
defendants will tend towards a 50-50 success rate in tried cases. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation, 13 J. Leg. Stud. 1, 5-6 (1984) (asserting that litigants tend to try
cases where liability is close because close cases are harder to value and therefore less likely to yield
zone of settlement agreement). More recent empirical work suggests that plaintiffs win fewer than 50%
of trials. See Daniel Kessles et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fijfty-Percent Rule: A Multimodel
Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. Leg. Stud. 233, 236 (1996); see also Leandra
Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study ofPredictors ofFailure to Settle, 49 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 315,325 n.37 (1999) (collecting studies). Recent work also suggests that, even if plaintiffs
win 50% of the time in the aggregate, success rates may vary across different types of cases. See Samuel
R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of
Cases for Trial, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319, 334 (1991). If defendants in fact win more than 50% of trials,
then the trial savings from bifurcation would be even greater.
15. This is a conservative estimate. One judge reports this figure to be closer to 90%. See Robert
Satter, Doing Justice: A Trial Judge at Work 138 (1990).
16. Twenty-three percent trial savings calculated by: 0.70x 0.33 = 0.231.
17. See Fed. t Civ. P. 16(c) (listing case-management considerations to be discussed at pretrial
conference). Rule 16 was amended in 1993 specifically to "call attention to the opportunities for
structuring of trial under Rules 42, 50, and 52" and to reaffirm "the authority of the court to ... provide
for an efficient and economical trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1993). Rule I also
was amended in 1993 to state that the rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (changes italicized). The
words "and administered" were added to emphasize "the affirmative duty" of the federal courts to use
the procedures authorized in the federal rules to minimize cost and delay. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory
committee's note (1993).
18. See Note, Separate Trials on Liability and Damages in "Routine Cases'". A Legal Analysis, 46
Minn. L. Rev. 1059, 1060 (1962).
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limited circumstances. 9 Federal courts rarely bifurcated the issues of
liability and damages; when federal courts did, they usually bifurcated
patent cases or other "complex cases" where the expected damages
evidence was so specialized or lengthy that the chance of avoiding a
damages trial was too attractive to pass up.
20
The fact that the federal judiciary gave bifurcation a cool reception is not
surprising. Until 1938, federal law courts did not even have the option to
bifurcate. 2' Thus, the unitary trial was an entrenched part of the federal civil
22jury system. The surprise is how little bifurcation practice has changed in
the last sixty years. The procedural landscape today is vastly different from
that which existed in 1938; modem innovations such as managerial judges'
and expanded summary judgment practice,24 though sometimes criticized,
are largely accepted, particularly within the federal judiciary. Bifurcation,
19. See Landsman et al., supra note 7, at 304 (charting cases); Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or
Issue in Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 743,
757 (1955) (listing cases bifurcating defenses of statute of limitations, res judicata, estoppel by
judgment, and statute of frauds).
20. See Bedecarr6, supra note 6, at 133; Note, supra note 19, at 759-60 (discussing bifurcation of
liability and damages in mass-tort and patent-infringement cases).
21. In contrast, by the early twentieth century, state courts and federal courts sitting in equity had
been granted the power to bifurcate. See Henderson et al., supra note 9, at 1676.
22. See id. at 1675.
23. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982). Many question the
wisdom of active judicial case management. See, e.g., id.passim; E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging
and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 306,334-35 (1986) (stating that managerial judging
is only stopgap solution to more fundamental problem of inappropriate litigation incentives within
federal rules). However, the 1993 amendments to Rule 16 appear to evidence a consensus among
lawmakers and the judiciary that federal judges should embrace a more hands-on approach to case
management. See Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revised, and Related Rules: Analysis of Recent
Developments for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 157 F.R.D. 69,71 ("[T]he amended rule advocates the
use of various creative legal procedures to clear out our bulging court dockets.").
24. As the U.S. Supreme Court admonished, "[s]ummaryjudgment procedure is properly regarded not
as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). "[I]t seems clear that the Court's purpose [in
Celotex] was to make summary judgment easier to obtain, and the lower courts... appear to have gotten
this message." Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 725, 740 (1989). As with the
development of managerial judges, not everyone agreed that expanded summary judgment practice was
a good idea. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 95, 99 (1988)
(describing Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy of summary judgment cases as "faulty and ill-conceived.., in
light of purposes for which civil litigation system exists"); see also Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 75 (1990) ("[L]iberalized
summaryjudgment inhibits the filing of otherwise meritorious suits and results in a wealth transfer from
plaintiffs as a class to defendants as a class.").
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however, has not evolved at the same rate. While some federal judges seem
to welcome opportunities to bifurcate, most federal judges still view issue
bifurcation as a specialized tool rather than an everyday trial technique. 5
Why has bifurcation failed to become a more prominent part of the
procedural landscape? It is not for a lack of advocates. For decades, scholars
have championed bifurcation as a means to decrease trial time, increase
efficiency, and ensure the faithful application of the law. 6 In 1959, the
bifurcation movement rose to prominence under the leadership of Judge
Julius Miner, who persuaded his colleagues on the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois to adopt Local Rule 21,
encouraging the routine bifurcation of liability and damages in personal
injury cases.27 Soon thereafter, a study of Local Rule 21 by a group from the
University of Chicago seemed to vindicate Judge Miner: the study showed
that bifurcation was yielding trial savings of approximately twenty
percent.28
The backlash against routine bifurcation, however, was swift and
powerful. Critics from the legal academic community and the local bar
derided Local Rule 21 as a too drastic measure that infringed the traditional
province of the jury and threatened to alter the verdict landscape
dramatically, primarily by taking away the jury's power to use compromise
verdicts to temper harsh legal rules like strict contributory negligence.29
Thus, the battle lines were drawn between those who viewed bifurcation as
25. See Part LB.2.
26. See Mayers, supra note 9, at 389; Julius H. Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45
A.B.A. J. 1265, 1268 (1959); Warren F. Schwartz, Severance-A Means of Minimizing the Role of
Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1197, 1206-07
(1967).
27. See N.D. Ill. R. 21 (vacated Aug. 19, 1995); Miner, supra note 26, at 1268 (discussing adoption of
Local Rule 21). For details on Local Rule 21, see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
28. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1619.
29. See Philip H. Corboy, Will Split Trials Solve Court Delay? A Negative Response, 52 Ill. B.J. 1004,
passim (1964); Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bijurcation ofJury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use ofRule Making Power, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 831,834 (1961); Charles Alan Wright, The
Federal Courts-A Century AfterAppomattox, 52 A.B.A. J. 742,747 (1966). More recent scholarship
continues this theme and adds the argument that the more extreme forms of issue separation such as
trifurcation harm plaintiffs and the civil jury system by creating a sterile trial environment where
important issues are decided in a cold and compassionless setting. See Jennifer M. Granholm & William
J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. Tol. L. Rev.
505, 513 (1995); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev.
69,81; Sandra A. Smith, Comment, Polyfircation andthe Right to a CivilJury Trial: Little Grace in the
Woburn Case, 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 649,665 (1998) (discussing Erie concerns). For details about
the Erie doctrine's relevance to bifurcation, see infra notes 199-213.
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a tool for efficient and lawful jury decision making and those who viewed
bifurcation as a device that overstepped the line between substantive law
and procedure and threatened the sanctity of the civil jury system itself.
The opponents of bifurcation scored a decisive victory in that battle in
1966, when Rule 42(b) was amended as part of the union of civil procedure
and admiralty practice.30 Although the changes to the text of Rule 42(b)
were essentially neutral,3 ' the advisory committee notes had a significant
and long-standing impact on the bifurcation movement. The notes
nominally encouraged courts to consider bifurcation, but then sternly added
that the "separation of issues was not to be routinely ordered. '3 2 This
language galvanized a presumption against bifurcation that persists to this
day,33 and bifurcation practice-particularly in ordinary cases-has been at
a standstill ever since.34
This Article examines whether the presumption against bifurcation of
issues in ordinary cases has current justification.35 Stated otherwise, is there
any good reason for courts to presume to try all of the issues together when
trying them separately would be more expedient?36 Efficiency is not the
only criteria for choosing procedures; accuracy and fairness are also
30. See 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388, at 475.
31. For example, the amendments specified that efficiency was a proper ground for bifurcation. See 8
Moore's Federal Practice, supra note I, § 42 app.02 (providing "red-lined" textual changes). That
addition was deemed "quite unnecessary," however, since the courts had long considered efficiency to
be an appropriate basis for bifurcation. 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388, at 475.
The addition ofan express reference to preserving the right to jury trial was similarly superfluous, given
the supremacy of the Seventh Amendment and the existing protection supplied by Rule 38. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 38.
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) advisory committee's note (1966).
33. See infra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
34. As Professor Marcus recently noted, "despite the rather longstanding debate about the desirability
of bifurcation under Rule 42(b), there has been rather little direction on when bifurcation should be
employed." Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 879,916
(discussing treatment of bifurcation in Complex Litigation Project, infra note 130).
35. This article does not address claim bifurcation, which is also authorized under Rule 42(b). In
general, the standards for claim bifurcation and issue bifurcation are the same. See 8 Moore's Federal
Practice, supra note 1, § 42.20(4)(a). The dynamics are often very different, however, largely because
the resolution of one claim ordinarily is not dispositive of the others. Two areas where claim bifurcation
receives considerable attention are civil-rights claims against municipalities and bad-faith insurance
litigation. See. e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in
Police Brutality Cases, 44 Hastings L.J. 499 (1993); Kevin M. LaCroix, Trial Bifurcation Provides
Important Benefits to Insurers, 7 Inside Lit., Oct. 1993, at 15.
36. One answer may be to contest the predicate assumption that issue-bifurcated trials are more
expedient. Part IV addresses that question.
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important, if not paramount.37 Perhaps those values support an inefficient
presumption. And sometimes the Constitution forbids a potentially more
efficient procedure.38 This Article, however, concludes that the Constitution
does not require the presumption against bifurcation and that the
presumption disserves the goals of Rule 42(b). Rather, a more aggressive
approach to bifurcation in the federal courts would better serve those goals.
Part I begins by tracing the history of bifurcation, paying particular
attention to the mid-1960s when bifurcation enjoyed fervid but fleeting
popularity. Part I concludes with an overview of modem bifurcation
practice, emphasizing the disconnection between what federal judges say
about bifurcation-they say they are big fans 39 -and what they actually do.
For the most part, bifurcation practice in the federal courts has changed
little since the mid-1960s. There is still a strong presumption against issue
bifurcation and the federal judiciary largely relegates its use to a few narrow
areas.
40
This Article then discusses the possible justifications for the presumption
against bifurcation. Part II starts the inquiry by exploring two potential
constitutional limits on issue bifurcation: the Erie doctrine and the Seventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Erie doctrine, which limits
federal procedural encroachment on state substantive law,4' poses little
resistance to bifurcation under Rule 42(b). And while the Seventh
Amendment contains important instructions on how to bifurcate issues
within cases, it places few if any restrictions on the ability to bifurcate
generally.42 Part II concludes that neither the Seventh Amendment nor the
37. See A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long
Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 692-93 (1995) (listing simplicity, consensus, and
uniformity as procedural values as well); see generally, Michael Bayles, Principlesfor Legal Procedure,
5 Law & Phil. 33, 41-57 (1986) (identifying nine principles of procedure, including efficiency,
accuracy, and fairness).
38. The rule prohibiting federal judges from deciding factual disputes on summary judgment, for
example, exists not because it best advances the goals ofaccuracy or efficiency but because the Seventh
Amendment requires it. See I 0A Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2714.
39. See Louis Harris et al., Judges Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal
Trial Judges Who SpendAt Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 731,743-45
(1989) (reporting poll results and analysis) [hereinafter Harris Poll].
40. See infra notes 113-46 and accompanying text.
41. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
42. The Seventh Amendment guarantees both that the right to a jury trial in civil cases will be
preserved and that issues once decided will not be re-examined. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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Erie doctrine requires or explains the longstanding presumption against
bifurcation in federal courts.
Because the Constitution has little to say about bifurcation, the
presumption against bifurcation represents a policy choice-made partly by
the drafters of the federal rules and partly by the federal judiciary-to
disfavor bifurcation notwithstanding its potential for efficiency. Part III
addresses whether the choice was a wise one: specifically, whether any
important policies support choosing what appears to be an inefficient
presumption. This area has seen the most heated debate, as critics of
bifurcation have interposed policy objections that have bedeviled
bifurcation almost since its inception.43 This Article identifies the three
most prominent policy criticisms and scrutinizes their validity."
Part III first examines the argument that bifurcation is pro-defendant, a
conclusion grounded in early empirical studies indicating that bifurcation
reduced plaintiffs' success in establishing liability.4" While bifurcation
almost certainly can affect outcomes, the "pro-defendant" label appears
unwarranted, or at least incomplete and misleading. First, the label is
applied to too many different types of cases without sufficient qualification.
The studies that detected an impact on outcomes all dealt with personal-
injury tort situations, yet personal-injury torts are but a share of the federal
docket.46 There is little basis to think that bifurcation will affect other types
of lawsuits in the same fashion. Second, even in the personal-injury tort
context, recent studies suggest that bifurcation may actually increase the
amount of damages recovered by the plaintiffs who are successful.47 In
short, the critics of bifurcation have not shown the purported pro-defendant
effects of bifurcation to be sufficiently widespread to support a presumption
against bifurcation in all federal cases.
Part III then considers the argument that bifurcation infringes on the
proper role of the civil jury. This entails examining the impact of
bifurcation on the four primary functions of the civil jury: (1) deciding
43. See Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of the
Adversarial Process, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 355, 383 n.201 (1998) (noting that bifurcation "is an idea
that has been suggested and opposed for over 50 years").
44. See infra Part III.
45. See Wright, supra note 29, at 747 (noting study showing increase in defense verdicts from 42% to
79%).
46. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
47. See Landsman et al., supra note 7, at 329; Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An
Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 269,
283-84 (1990).
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cases; (2) checking the abuse of government power; (3) legitimizing
verdicts; and (4) creating a forum for citizen participation in government. 8
First, Part III concludes that bifurcation does not impair jury decision
making. According to Pennington and Hastie, juries decide cases by
constructing stories based on the evidence presented at trial.49 Because
bifurcation alters the evidence presented by separating the issues at trial, it
could impair jury story construction. This Article concludes, however, that
bifurcation probably enhances story construction by ordering the evidence
into smaller, issue-centered segments where it is easier to recall and
assimilate." Second, Part III concludes that bifurcation does not improperly
limit the jury's ability to check government abuse. Opponents of bifurcation
have argued that juries who hear issues separately are less likely to temper a
harsh legal result through jury nullification or compromise verdicts.5 '
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected civil nullification and
compromise verdicts for nearly a century. 2 Moreover, bifurcation itself
does not preclude nullification-a jury hearing only the liability issue
remains free to reject the law by rendering a counter-factual decision on that
point. Without the damages evidence, however, the jury may have no desire
to nullify liability standards. Nevertheless, a procedure that merely reduces
the incentive for a jury to do that which the U.S. Supreme Court has
forbidden cannot be said to impair any valued role of the civil jury. Finally,
this Article concludes that bifurcation is consonant with the jury's function
of legitimizing verdicts and creating a forum for deliberative democracy,
because those functions inhere in the institution of the citizen jury,
regardless of the trial format. Accordingly, this Article concludes thatjurors
in bifurcated trials can perform the primary functions of civil jurors as well
as-if not better than-jurors in unitary trials.
Part III concludes by examining whether the goal of avoiding prejudice
supports the presumption against bifurcation. Here, the argument fails
entirely. The "prejudice" that Rule 42(b) is trying to avoid is the risk that
the jury will improperly let evidence from one issue influence its decision
48. See Developments in the Law-The CivilJury, 110Harv.L.Rev. 1408,1423 (1997) [hereinafter
Civil Jury].
49. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory ofJury Decision Making: The Story Model,
13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 520-21 (1991).
50. See infra notes 278-304 and accompanying text.
51. See Paula L. Hannaford, etal., How Judges View CivilJuries, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 247,260 (1998)
(discussing critics' contention that bifurcation removesjury's ability to inteject community values into
its deliberations).
52. See infra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
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on another issue. 3 Logically, bifurcation can never cause that type of
prejudice because its very effect is to segment the trial so that the jury does
not even hear the prejudicial evidence. Recently, however, some courts and
commentators have warned that bifurcation can cause prejudice by creating
a "sterile trial atmosphere" where plaintiffs cannot present their entire cases
before juries.54 The argument merits consideration but ultimately fails. It is
true that jurors in bifurcated cases are less likely to feel sympathy for the
plaintiff because they do not hear testimony regarding the plaintiff's
damages.55 And if, as a result, the jurors pay less attention to the merits or
do not take their roles as jurors seriously, then bifurcation might prejudice a
plaintiff by impairing the overall quality of the jury's decision. 6 The
argument is flawed, however, because the courts have other means available
to ensure that jurors understand the significance of the case and their roles
as jurors. 7
Part IV revisits the assertion that increased bifurcation will increase
efficiency by reducing overall trial time. Though not conclusive, the
available evidence supports the general conclusion that bifurcation offers
substantial efficiencies. 8 This does not mean that bifurcation will be more
efficient in all cases. A presumption for bifurcation might be just as bad as
a presumption against bifurcation. This Article concludes that a rule of no
presumption will maximize efficiency. Such a rule would require the trial
judge to determine independently whether to try any issues in a case
separately to achieve increased efficiency.
Part V proposes to eliminate the presumption against bifurcation and
urges judges to aggressively seek opportunities to bifurcate. This approach
does not require any changes to the existing criteria for bifurcation in Rule
53. See infra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
54. The Sixth Circuit decided the seminal cases discussing the risk of a sterile trial environment. See
In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 315-16 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d
207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982).
55. See Brian H. Bomstein, From Compassion to Compensation: The Effect of Injury Severity on
Mock Jurors'Liability Judgments, 28 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1477, 1485 (1998) (demonstrating that
severity of plaintiff's injuries significantly increased both sympathy jurors felt for plaintiff and
plaintiff's likelihood of prevailing on liability).
56. See Neil R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 Tenn. L.
Rev. 1, 29-30 (1997) (arguing that sympathy plays important role in alerting juries that they should pay
attention because there may be "justice-related matter worth looking into").
57. See infra notes 363-70 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 390-402 and accompanying text. The existing studies all indicate that bifurcation
is more efficient in the long run. See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion
Problem, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 527, 554 (1989); Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1619.
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42(b), which already authorizes judges to bifurcate issues in their discretion
to enhance judicial administration." What is needed is a change in attitude.
That change can best be accomplished by adding language to Rule 42(b)
specifying that there is no presumption against bifurcation and amending
the advisory committee's notes-which currently disfavor the "routine" use
of bifurcation in ordinary cases -to encourage judges to seek bifurcation
opportunities aggressively. The notes should also make clear that litigants
and courts share responsibility for deciding whether bifurcation of any
issues can be more efficient. Unbound from the historic policy objections
and the belief that bifurcated trials should be the exception to the unitary
trial rule, the federal judiciary should increase bifurcation to its most
efficient usage.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF BIFURCATION
A. A BrieffHistory of Bifurcation
Bifurcation does not get much press, but it has a relatively vibrant past
populated by some prominent players in the procedure world. Bifurcation as
it currently exists began in 1938 with the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." While the concept of trying issues separately was familiar
in equity courts, 2 the enactment of Rule 42(b) marked the first time a
statute or rule expressly authorized federal judges to try issues separately
within a single action at law.6'
At almost the same time that Rule 42(b) first authorized separated trials,
Professor Lewis Mayers condemned the unitary trial as irrational and
absurd.' Professor Mayers argued that the law courts should follow the lead
of the equity courts and try issues separately to avoid wasting time trying
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
60. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) advisory committee's note (1966).
61. TheFederal Rules ofCivil Procedure took effect on September 16, 1938. See4 Federal Practice
and Procedure, supra note 2, § 1004.
62. Equitable actions for accounting, for example, frequently bifurcated the existence of liability from
the measure of damages. See Mayers, supra note 9, at 389. Ironically, the bifurcated equitable action for
accounting itself derived from a similar bifurcated action at law used in England in the 17th and 18th
centuries. See id at 391. Over time, however, the action at law became so complicated that it eventually
"lapsed into disuse." Id. at 392-93.
63. See Note, supra note 18, at 1060.
64. See Mayers, supra note 9, at 389, 391.
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what often turn out to be irrelevant issues."s He considered the judicial
effort spent on trying ultimately irrelevant issues to be "sheer waste."'
Professor Mayers further argued that bifurcation, while primarily a tool
of efficiency, would yield the additional benefit of reducing compromise
and sympathy verdicts.67 He had observed a phenomenon familiar to all trial
lawyers, then and today: juries often ignore the evidence and instructions
pertaining to liability and award damages to undeserving plaintiffs when
they feel sorry for the plaintiff and believe that the defendant is better able
to bear the cost.68 Although strict application of some of the existing laws
might yield harsh results, he argued that the cause of reform was better
served in the long run by exposing the harshness of the rules through rigid
application than by having juries mitigate their harshness on a case-by-case
basis:
Outworn the doctrines may be; but surely, if so, there is a better way
of modernizing them than by permitting juries to ignore them. If the
adoption of the present proposal should result in these cases in a more
rigorous application of our negligence doctrines than now obtains, the
natural outcome will be to bring to a head whatever just
dissatisfaction exists, with resultant reform or amelioration of the
doctrines. 9
Thus, Professor Mayers believed that bifurcation would ultimately advance
the interests of efficiency, the rule of law, and genuine law reform.
While Professor Mayers almost certainly would have welcomed a statute
or rule authorizing bifurcation of actions at law,7" he realized that neither
65. Professor Mayers compared how equity and law courts would handle a comparable dispute arising
out of an employee's claim to business profits from his employer. In an equitable action for accounting,
the trial might end after one day if the jury found the plaintiff had not proved a right to share in the
profits. See id. at 389-90. In an action at law, however, the jury would be required to hear several days
of testimony relating to damages before it could return a defense verdict of no liability. See id
66. Id. at 390. Professor Mayers minced no words in stating his dislike of unitary trials: "The process
is inherently so absurd, so at variance with the procedure followed in investigations in every other
department of life, that only our lifelong inurement to it makes it possible for us to accept it without
question." Id. at 389.
67. See id. at 394 ("A jury confronted solely with the issue of negligence might well be more heedful
of the law as laid down by the court.").
68. See id. at 394. Professor Mayers wryly put it this way: "[O]urjuries have come largely to ignore
the issue of liability except as a factor in the mitigation or appreciation of damages." Id.
69. Id. at 394-95.
70. At the time the article was written, the Advisory Committee's final draft of what was to become
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had deleted a proposed Rule 43(b) authorizing federal courts to
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would be enough. Recognizing that any workable rule would necessarily
vest vast discretion in the trial judge, Professor Mayers foresaw that the
actual effect of any such rule or statute would still depend on "a change in
the traditional attitude of bench and bar toward the matter."' He was not
optimistic, and appropriately so. For the next twenty years, bifurcation
made only limited and infrequent inroads into everyday federal procedure.7 2
Then something interesting happened. With court congestion and delay
reaching what then seemed to be critical levels,73 proceduralists began
thinking about ways to speed up trials, thereby reducing the hardship caused
by delay. At the forefront of this movement was Judge Julius Miner of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, who proposed to his
colleagues that they adopt a rule providing for an initial trial on liability in
personal injury and other civil litigation as a prerequisite to adjudicating the
extent of injury and measure of damages.74 The Eastern Division of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed and adopted what
became Local Rule 2 1, which encouraged but did not require bifurcation of
liability and damages in tort cases.75 Judge Miner predicted that Local Rule
"order separate trials, and determine the order thereof, of any distinct issues arising in an action." Id. at
396 n.18 (internal quotations omitted).
71. Id at 397.
72. See 2B William W. Barron et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 943 (1961) (identifying
situations in which courts granted bifurcation). This treatise, the predecessor to the "Wright and Miller"
of modem trial practice, showed little enthusiasm for bifurcation: "The trial piecemeal ofseparate issues
in a single suit is not to be the usual course. It should be resorted to only in the exercise of informed
discretion and in a case and at ajuncture which move the court to conclude that such action will really
further convenience or avoid prejudice." Id. at 187. A 1955 student note, for example, could find only
six cases where liability and damages were tried separately, four of which were patent cases. See Note,
supra note 19, at 763 app. A; see also Landsman et al., supra note 7, at 305 (charting cases).
73. See Hans Zeisel etal., DelayIn The Courts xxi (2d ed. 1978) ("One of the urgent problems in law
today is court congestion and delay.").
74. See Miner, supra note 26, at 1268.
75. The Local Rule provided in full:
Pursuant to and in furtherance of Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to curtail undue
delay in the administration ofjustice in personal injury and other civil litigation wherein the issue of
liability may be adjudicated as a prerequisite to the determination of any or all other issues, injury
and non-jury cases, a separate trial may be had upon such issue of liability, upon motion of any of
the parties orat the Court's discretion, in any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim.
In the event liability is sustained, the court may recess for pretrial or settlement conference or
proceed with the trial on any or all of the remaining issues before the Court, before the same jury or
before anotherjury as conditions may require and the Court shall deem meet.
The court, however, may proceed to trial upon all or any combination of issues if, in its discretion,
and in furtherance ofjustice, it shall appear that a separate trial will work a hardship upon any of the
parties or will result in protracted or costly litigation.
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21 would obviate the need for damages evidence in the 40% of trials that
result in defense verdicts, leading to an overall savings of trial time of
between 28% and 32%.76
Rule 21 garnered immediate attention from the local bar and beyond,
much of it critical." Its most formidable opponent was Jack Weinstein, then
a professor at Columbia University, who contended that bifurcation
interfered with the role of the jury. Professor Weinstein argued that the true
value of juries was not to find facts or apply law, but to satisfy "a strongly
felt need for a 'fair decision,' for the judgment of reasonable and unbiased
peers instead of the logical, legally proper, result."78 Professor Weinstein
considered negligence cases (an express target of Rule 21) a perfect
example, because juries often ignored the rule of strict contributory
negligence, finding for the plaintiff on liability but then discounting
damages to reflect the plaintiffs responsibility.79 Professor Weinstein
acknowledged that proponents of bifurcation such as Professor Mayers had
praised bifurcation precisely because it limited that type of jury conduct."°
In his mind, however, procedural devices that forced juries to stay within
the law prevented them from "keeping the actual operation of the law more
responsive to human needs than an archaic substantive law would permit if
it were carried out in letter and spirit."'" Stated otherwise, Professor
Id. at 1268, 1333 (internal quotation omitted). While Local Rule 21 technically did not grant any more
power or discretion to judges than already existed under Rule 42(b), it sent a clear signal to thejudges in
the Eastern Division of the Northern District that separate trials should be ordered in routine negligence
cases, contrary to previous practice under Rule 42(b). See Note, supra note 63, at 1065.
76. See Miner, supra note 26, at 1333 (citing Hans Zeisel et al., Delay In The Courts 99 (1959)).
Judge Miner estimated (but provided no citation) that damages evidence in personal injury cases
consumed between 70% to 80% of the trial time which would alone yield an overall trial savings of
between 28% and 32%. See id.
77. An early critic was Philip Corboy, a prominent Chicago personal injury lawyer. See Corboy,
supra note 29, at 1022-23 (basing his writing on speech given at 1963 American Bar Association
convention). The rule and the case law applying it also spawned several law review notes. See generally,
e.g., James J. Harrington, Legislation and Administration, 36 Notre Dame L. Rev. 388 (1961)
(discussing Hosie v. Chicago & Northwest Ry. Co., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960)); Recent Case, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 781(1961); (same); Thomas D. Aitken, Comment, Trial Practice: Separate Trials on the
Issues of Liability and Damages, 17 Okla. L. Rev. 114 (1964); Thomas E. Maloney, Comment,
Implications ofBifurcation in the Ordinary Negligence Case, 26 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 99 (1964); Note, supra
note 18; Note, Separation of Issues of Liability and Damages in Personal Injury Cases: An Attempt to
Combat Congestion by Rule of Court, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 815 (1961).
78. See Weinstein, supra note 29, at 833.
79. See id. at 833-34 (discussing jury practice of applying de facto comparative-negligence
standard).
80. Seeid. at 834 & n.13.
81. Id. at 834 (internal quotation omitted).
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Weinstein depended on juries to keep the law current, rather than judges or
legislatures, and it was this role, rather than the traditional fact-finding role,
that made the jury system worth defending."2
Professor Weinstein was also skeptical about the efficiency of
bifurcation. He argued, for example, that any efficiency benefits of
bifurcation could disappear once juries learned that they needed to find
liability in order to award tempered damages to a partially responsible
plaintiff. 3 He also cautioned that routine bifurcation might actually increase
the number of jury trials overall by reducing pre-trial settlements or jury
waivers." Thus, while Professor Weinstein began his case against
bifurcation on quasi-constitutional grounds, he ended it on a purely practical
note, emphasizing that "[n]o study published to date furnishes acceptable
quantitative proof that the split trial, routinely applied, over the long run
will appreciably reduce calendar congestion." 5
The proof was just around the comer. Prior to promulgating Local Rule
21, the Northern District asked Hans Zeisel of the University of Chicago
Law School to study the actual effect of Local Rule 21 on the court's trial
load. 6 Professor Zeisel hypothesized that routine bifurcation under Local
Rule 21 would save substantial trial time because many cases (he estimated
40%) would end with a finding of no liability and many other cases would
settle after a determination of liability. 7 What was not known was whether
82. See id. at832.The effect ofbifurcation onjury verdicts triggered a second objection-that Local
Rule 21 ran afoul of the Erie doctrine. Under the "outcome-determination" standard in effect at the time,
Professor Weinstein suggested that Local Rule 21 might be "substantive" because of its "substantial
impact on the law of contributory negligence." Id. at 836. However, ProfessorWeinstein was clearly not
arguing that bifurcation itself was unconstitutional. Rather, he found Local Rule 21's substantive
impacts especially disturbing because, being a local rule, Local Rule 21 did not benefit from the "mature
consideration of informed opinion" given to the Federal Rules by relevant authorities including the U.S.
Supreme Court and Congress. Id. at 839 (citing Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960)). Professor
Weinstein built on this theme in his later book on rulemaking. See Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Court
Rule-Making Procedures 117-54 (1977).
83. See Weinstein, supra note 29, at 849.
84. See id. at 849-50. Professor Weinstein conceded that there is usually a countervailing factor, such
as the likelihood of post-liability settlements. Id. at 850. Similarly, Professor Weinstein acknowledged
that a possible increase of cases removed to federal courts would likely be offset by the possibility that
plaintiffs might file their lawsuits in state courts to avoid Rule 21. Id.
85. d at 853.
86. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1607. The study did not attempt to determine whether
Local Rule 21 altered the substance of the jury verdicts. See id. While the study stated that Professor
Zeisel and his colleagues were busy "collecting data which might have a bearing on this problem," id. at
1625, it does not appear any such study was ever published.
87. See id at 1607-08. ProfessorZeisel based these figures on the nationwide study ofciviljury trials
that culminated in his earlier book, Hans Zeisel et al., Delay in the Courts (1959).
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countervailing factors such as a decrease in pre-trial settlements or jury
waivers might offset these savings. Increased bifurcation could also create
inefficiencies by increasing the rate of hung juries or overall trial time.88
Accordingly, Professor Zeisel studied Local Rule 21 in action to see if
bifurcation was in fact more efficient and, if so, how much more efficient.
The study confirmed Professor Zeisel's hypothesis: bifurcation had
reduced trial time by about 20%."9 Moreover, none of the feared
countervailing effects were detected. First, the bifurcated trials that required
two verdicts were no longer than unitary trials (and indeed may have been
shorter overall).' Second, bifurcation did not increase overall deliberation
time because, while juries in bifurcated trials deliberated significantly
longer than juries in unitary trials, they had to decide damages in so few
cases that on average jury deliberation time dropped by about twenty
minutes per case.9 Third, Professor Zeisel discerned no statistically
significant variance injury waivers or hung juries.92 Finally, Local Rule 21
had absolutely no effect on the frequency of pre-trial settlements.93
Professor Zeisel concluded that bifurcation was more efficient, that there
were no countervailing offsets to bifurcation, and, therefore, that courts
should bifurcate as frequently as possible if they want to realize maximum
efficiency.'
88. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1608.
89. See id. at 1619. Strictly speaking, this figure is limited to personal injury actions, because the
study did not have statistically significant samples to analyze contract and other non-tort cases. See id at
1610. Professor Zeisel at least was willing to suggest comparable savings for non-tort cases "within
reason." Id.
90. See id. at 1610, 1621 (stating that full bifurcated trials averaged of 4.0 days; unitary trials
averaged 4.7 days).
91. Juries in bifurcated cases took on average only 2.7 hours to decide liability, whereas juries in
unitary cases took on average 3.7 hours to decide liability and damages. See id. at 1621. While juries in
bifurcated cases took an additional 3.4 hours to decide damages, they were called on to do so in only
12% of the cases, whereas juries in unitary trials reached verdicts 73% of the time. See id. Thus, overall
average jury time dropped from 2.7 hours per case to 2.33 hours per case. See id.
92. See id. at 1622-23.
93. The numbers in this regard are rather remarkable. During the two-year period prior to the
implementation of Local Rule 21, 1435 personal injury cases were filed, of which only 217 reached trial.
See id. at 1623. During the two-year period after Local Rule 21, 1433 personal injury cases were filed, of
which only 216 reached trial. See id. Thus, the pre-trial settlement rate remained constant at 84.9% of
personal injury cases. See id.
94. See id. at 1624. In this respect, Professor Zeisel points out that judges should not attempt to select
"good candidates" for bifurcation based on the likelihood of a defense verdict. Id. Even to the extent
judges could make informed decisions in this regard, it overlooks the fact that two-thirds of cases finding
liability terminate in pre-damages settlement. See id.
Vol. 75:705, 2000
Bifurcation
Despite these impressive results, the bifurcation movement came to an
abrupt halt in 1966, when Rule 42(b) was amended as part of the union
of admiralty and civil procedure.95 The amendments to the rule itself took
no position on the merits of increased bifurcation, but the accompanying
advisory committee notes spelled doom for the bifurcation movement:
"While separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered, it is
important that it be encouraged where experience has demonstrated its
worth."
96
It has been suggested that the amendments to the text of Rule 42 were
"carefully couched so as to take no position with respect to severance in
civil actions,"'97 and perhaps the committee intended this language to
straddle the fence between Professor Weinstein and Judge Miner. Its
impact, however, has been anything but neutral. To this day, the advisory
committee note is cited as creating a rule-based presumption against issue
bifurcation.9" The leading procedure treatise at the time echoed that view,
commenting that the advisory committee note "though cryptic, suggests that
in addition to reassuring the admiralty bar, the changes in Rule 42 were
intended to give rather Delphic encouragement to separate trial of liability
issues, while warning against routine bifurcation of the ordinary negligence
case."
99
With that, the bifurcation movement beat a hasty and whimpering retreat.
Perhaps the 1966 amendment-combined with the criticism of bifurcation
by several leading figures-effectively ended the debate. Bad timing may
also have played a role. One suspects that Judge Miner had been eagerly
awaiting the results of Professor Zeisel's study, coiled to counterattack
Professor Weinstein's assault on Local Rule 21. But it was not to be. Judge
95. The purpose of the amendment was to assure the admiralty bar that the practice of bifurcating
liability and damages in admiralty cases would not change. 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra
note 2, § 2388, at 475;see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) advisory committee's note (1966) ("In certain suits
in admiralty separation for trial of the issues of liability and damages ... has been conducive to
expedition and economy.").
96. 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388, at 475; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b)
advisory committee's note (1966).
97. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 1210.
98. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
99. 2B Barron et a., supra note 72, § 943, at 67 (Supp. 1970). By 1970, Professor Charles Alan
Wright had taken over editing of the treatise which now bears his name. This view was foreshadowed in
Professor Wright's earlier commentary on the law explosion in which he advanced the view-much as
had Professor Weinstein-that routine bifurcation effected so strong a change in the outcome ofjury
trials that, if it could be implemented at all, it had to come at the hands of Congress and not the courts.
Wright, supra note 29, at 747.
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Miner died the same day Professor Zeisel submitted his report to the
Northern District,00 leaving bifurcation without its most prominent and
most vocal advocate.' 1 Whatever the cause, the lively bifurcation debate of
the 1960s did not live to see the 1970s.
B. After the Fall: Modern Bifurcation Practice
Bifurcation practice today has changed little from bifurcation practice in
the 1960s. While bifurcation currently lacks an individual champion from
the bench like Judge Miner, the federal judiciary as a whole is
overwhelmingly supportive ofbifurcation.10 2As then, however, this support
rarely extends beyond its use in commonly accepted contexts such as
complex litigation and patent cases. 10 3 Few judges seem willing to break
from tradition and employ bifurcation in ordinary, single-plaintiff cases.
Overall, bifurcation remains controversial and is used infrequently."4
1. The View From the Bench
Judges love bifurcation, or at least so they say. According to a 1987
Harris poll, federal judges "overwhelmingly support" bifurcation.0 5 Of the
federal judges whose jurisdictions' rules allowed bifurcation," 6 94% said
100. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1606 n.2.
101. Professor Mayers could have re-assumed that role, and his later writings clearly signaled his
continuing belief in the benefits of expanded bifurcation, but by that time he had apparently shifted his
attention to larger, big-picture projects. See Lewis Mayers, The Machinery of Justice 39 (1973)
("[G]eneral adoption [of routine bifurcation] by the courts of law would greatly expedite the business of
the courts and save time for litigants, counsel, and witnesses as well."). Bifurcation did gamer a new
champion in Professor Warren Schwartz, a colleague of Professor Wright at the University ofTexas Law
School. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 1197. His article did not generate much activity, however,
possibly because people viewed bifurcation as a dead issue, or perhaps because his proposed rule-
which called for a stay of all proceedings, including discovery, until resolution of the severed issue and
mandatory jury waivers by the moving party-simply went too far. See id. at 1207.
102. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 111-12, 122-30 and accompanying text.
104. See Henderson et al., supra note 9, at 1684.
105. Harris Poll, supra note 39, at 733-34; see also John K. Setear, Comments on Judges' Opinions
On Procedural Issues, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 765, 778 (1989) ("The enthusiasm for bifurcation of trials verges
on the glowing.").
106. Two percent of the federal judges said the judicial rules of their jurisdiction did not allow
bifurcation. See Harris Pollsupra note 39, at 743 tbl.5. 1. However, Rule 42(b) empowers federal judges
to bifurcate any case, be it federal question or diversity, regardless of contrary state law. See infra, notes
207-208. There is no way of knowing whether these judges would bifurcate if they thought they could,
although one suspects a predisposition against bifurcation may have contributed to the misconception.
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they had bifurcated at least one case."0 7 When they did bifurcate, the judges
were very pleased with the results. Of the group who had bifurcated, 84%
stated that bifurcation helped the process, compared to only 3% who stated
it did not help the process'0 8 When asked if bifurcation had a positive or
negative impact on specific aspects of litigation, the federal judges were
similarly ebullient: 82% said bifurcation speeded up the trial process, 85%
said bifurcation expedited settlement, 79% said bifurcation reduced
transaction costs, and 80% said bifurcation improved the fairness of the
outcome.'0 9 Thus, as the authors of the Harris poll noted, "[b]ifurcation has
few critics among judges.""°
But what do these rave reviews really mean? Other poll results suggest
that when judges say they like bifurcation, what they really mean is that
they like bifurcation within its traditional parameters. For example, while
94% of the federal judges said they had bifurcated at least one case, less
than half of them had bifurcated more than five cases during the previous
three-year period."' Only 19% had bifurcated more than ten cases during
that three-year period."2 Thus, relatively few judges bifurcated frequently
enough during that period to indicate that they had been aggressively
looking for opportunities to bifurcate. Instead, they had simply been willing
to bifurcate the obvious candidates.
107. See Harris Poll, supra note 39, at 744 tbl.5.2.
108. See idU at 744 tbl.5.3. Another 9% indicated bifurcation made no material difference. The poll
does not account for the remaining 4%. See id.
109. See id. at 745 tbl.5.6.
110. Id. at 743. The state judges polled also raved about bifurcation. Like their federal counterparts,
84% of the state judges who had bifurcated thought it helped the process. See id. at 744 tbl.5.3. Just
under 80% of those judges agreed that bifurcation generally speeded up the trial process, expedited
settlements, reduced transaction costs, and improved the fairness of the outcomes. See id. at 745 tbl.5.6.
A recent poll of California state judges lends further support. See Franklin Strier, The Road to Reform:
Judges on Juries andAttorneys, 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1249, 1261 (1997) (quoting one judge as saying
that bifurcated trials "are shorter and settlement during the trial is more likely"); id. at 1273 n. 127 ("The
endorsement[ of issue separation... confirmed the sentiments of the judges in the major prior survey of
judicial opinions."). But see id. at 1261-62 (quoting another judge as saying, "I believe that issue-
separated trials denigrate the intelligence ofjurors to keep issues separate, and are a tremendous waste of
courtroom resources.").
I 11. See Harris Poll, supra note 39, at 744 tbl. 5.4.
112. See d (12% had bifurcated 11-20 times; 7% had bifurcated 21 times or more). The statejudges
in the Harris poll reported similar figures. Of the judges who did bifurcate, only 21% reported having
bifurcated I 1 or more cases during the three-year period preceding the poll. See id. In contrast, 57%
reported having bifurcated five or fewer cases during that period. See id.
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2. Bifurcation in the 1990s
Despite lauding bifurcation in the polls, in practice most federal judges
employ a presumption against bifurcation."3 Federal judges commonly
preface bifurcation discussions by saying that bifurcation is "not to be
routinely ordered.""' 4 Also typical are statements that bifurcation is the
exception to the rule of unitary trials,' that bifurcation should be limited to
exceptional circumstances," 6 and that bifurcation is an "extraordinary
measure."" 1 7 Frequently, this presumption manifests itself as a burden of
proof to be satisfied by the party seeking bifurcation." 8 Beyond citing to
precedent or the 1966 advisory committee note,"9 courts today rarely
articulate a basis for the presumption against bifurcation. 2' However, some
courts still view bifurcation as an affront to the sanctity of the civil jury
trial:
113. See 8 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, § 42.23 (asserting that bifurcation should not be
used in "simple" cases); 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388, at 474 ("The
piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single lawsuit... is not to be the usual course.").
114. Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1163, 1170 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (internal quotations
omitted); Marshall v. Overhead Door Corp., 131 F.R.D. 94, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1990). This view has been
applied even in the Northern District of Illinois. See Malone v. Pipefitters' Assoc. Local Union No. 597,
No. 87-C-9966, 1992 WL 73520, at *1 (N.D. III. Mar. 30, 1992) (citing Local Rule 21).
115. See Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assoc., 827 F. Supp. 233, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
116. See ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 38,43 (D. Conn. 1998); Marisol
v. Guiliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Sunenblick v. Harrell, 145 F.R.D. 314, 317
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[S]eparation of issues is not the usual course that should be followed.") (internal
quotations omitted).
117. Mangabat v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 92-1742, 1992 WL 211561, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26,
1992).
118. See 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388, at 83 (Supp. 1998); see, e.g.,
Novopharm Ltd. v.Torpharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308,310 (E.D.N.C. 1998); Princeton Biochemicals, Inc.
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 254,256 (D.N.J. 1997); Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v.
Lausell, 172 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.P.R. 1997); Ake v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 877 (W.D.N.Y.
1996); Home Elevators, Inc. v. Miller Elevator Serv. Co., 933 F. Supp. 1090, 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1996);
Marshall, 131 F.R.D. at 97.
119. The advisory committee's note states that "separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely
ordered." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) advisory committee's note. Courts frequently cite to the note as
establishing a presumption against routine bifurcation. See, e.g., Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., II F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993); Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir. 1978);
Lausell, 172 F.R.D. at 2; Hamm v. American Home Prods. Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (E.D. Cal.
1995); Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1163, 1170 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
120. A few cases assert the "general principle that a single trial tends to lessen the delay, expense, an
[sic] inconvenience to all parties." Mangabat, 1992 WL 211561, at *1; see, e.g., Hirschheimer v.
Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., No. 94-CV-6155JFK, 1997 WL 528057, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27,
1997).
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[T]he court should remain mindful of the traditional role of the
factfinder; i.e., to make an ultimate determination on the basis of the
case presented in its entirety. Because bifurcation works an
infringement on such an important aspect of the judicial process,
courts are cautioned that it is not the usual course that should be
followed.'2 '
The presumption against bifurcation is not insurmountable. Indeed,
federal judges regularly employ bifurcation in complex litigation such as
mass tort cases." Bifurcation is also common in patent litigation,"
complex environmental litigation, 24 antitrust litigation,"2 and complex
employment litigation. t26 In these situations, the courts typically support the
121. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. James River Corp., 131 F.R.D. 607, 608 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assoc., 827 F. Supp. 233, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("[Tlhe fundamental presumption which favors the trial of all issues to a single jury and underlies the
assumption of Rule 42(b) that bifurcation, even in personal injury actions, is reserved for truly
extraordinary situations of undue prejudice.").
122. See Shetterlyv. Raymark Indus., Inc., 117 F.3d 776,782(4th Cir. 1997) (allowing bifurcation in
asbestos case); Angelo, 11 F.3d at 964-65 (allowing reverse bifurcation in asbestos case); Borman v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 327,329 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); Adamsv. Shell Oil Co., 136 F.R.D. 588,
593 (E.D. La. 1991) (finding Rule 23(b)(3) class forcommon issues arising out of refinery explosion);
see generally N. Kathleen Strickland, How to Structure a Mass Toxic Tort Trial-Bifurcation,
Trifurcation, or Neither: Practical Considerations, 406 PLI/Lit. 287 (March 1991).
123. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 160 F.R.D. 30,33 (D. Del. 1995) ("Historically, courts have
found it worthwhile to hold separate trials on liability and damages issues in patent cases.") A special
application arises where the infringer relies on advice of counsel as a defense to willfulness. See, e.g.,
Novopharm Ltd. v. Torpharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308,311-12 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (placing willfulness in
damages phase); see generally Thomas L. Creel & Robert P. Taylor, Bifurcation, Trifurcation, Opinions
of Counsel, Privilege and Prejudice, 424 PLI/Pat. 823 (Nov. 1995) (discussing appropriate uses of
bifurcation in patent litigation).
124. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 452 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (obviating need for
months of additional trial on liability when jury returned defense verdict after 13-day trial on exposure
and causation); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,720 (2d Cir. 1993) (bifurcating
liability issues from party responsibility issues). Though the reported opinions provide little analysis
under Rule 42(b), the Woburn litigation is a now-famous example of polyfurcation in complex
environmental litigation. See Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action (1995). For an excellent and detailed
examination of the history behind the polyfurcation in the Woburn litigation, see Lewis A. Grossman &
Robert G. Vaughn, A Documentary Companion to A Civil Action 528-41 (1999).
125. See, e.g., Barr Lab., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 978 F.2d 98, 115 (3d Cir. 1992) (bifurcating definition
of the relevant product market); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897,
1998 WL 326721, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1998) (bifurcating liability and damages in class action);
SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 517,528-29 (D. Utah 1992) (bifurcating antitrust liability
from damages and trial of other claims).
126. "The majority of courts have held the bifurcation of liability and relief phases of Title VII suits
to be an appropriate means of litigating employment discrimination claims." Herbert Newberg & Alba
Conte, 5 Newberg on Class Actions § 24.123 (3d ed. 1992); see, e.g., EEOC v. Foster Wheeler
Constructors, Inc., No. 98-C-1601, 1999 WL 528200, at *2-3 (N.D. I11. July 13, 1999) (bifurcating
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decision to bifurcate by saying that bifurcation will be more efficient, save
trial time, and improve juror comprehension. 2 7 This attitude parallels (or
perhaps follows) that of the Manual for Complex Litigation, which also
endorses the use of bifurcation in complex litigation' as a means of
promoting efficiency, reducing the length of trial, improving juror
comprehension, and increasing settlement rates.129 Recently, the American
Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project similarly concluded that
bifurcation could promote efficiency and fairness in multi-party, multi-
forum complex litigation. 3 Thus, in the complex-litigation arena, the role
of bifurcation appears firmly entrenched and, if anything, seems likely to
grow even larger.
Bifurcation under Rule 42(b) occurs in ordinary cases as well. Indeed,
there are many recent examples ofjudges bifurcating ordinary tort cases,' 3 '
existence of hostile work environment from individual injury and damages in class action). But see
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to certify
employment class action on either all or some issues because of concern that common issues were not
distinct from individual issues).
127. See, e.g., Barr, 978 F.2d at 115 (enhancing juror comprehension of complex antitrust issue);
Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 254,258 (D.N.J. 1997) ("[T]he
complexity of the liability issues as well as the resulting potential threat of prejudice due to jury
confusion present a controversy ripe for bifurcation."); id. at 259 ("[Blifurcation will encourage judicial
economy and efficiency in light of the complexity of the damages issues."); Arnold v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (bifurcating liability and relief in
employment class action because "when liability is found during an initial phase, bifurcated cases often
settle, thereby obviating the need for adjudicating issues of class damages").
128. Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.632 (3d ed. 1995). The manual highlights bifurcation
opportunities in mass-tort cases, see id. § 33.28, antitrust litigation, see id. § 33.11, employment-
discrimination class actions, see id. § 33.53, patent litigation, see id. § 33.62, and CERCLA litigation,
see id. § 33.73.
129. See id. § 21.632. The manual cautions, however, that these benefits must be balanced against
potential off-setting factors such as increased cost, delay in reaching a final outcome, delay in reaching
settlement, inconvenience to the parties and witnesses, and "unfairness if the result is to prevent a litigant
from presenting a coherent picture to the trier of fact." Id.
130. See American Law Institute, Complex Litigation: Statutory Recommendations and Analysis
§ 3.06(a) (1994) (supporting authority of transferee judge to separate issues for trial to promote its just,
efficient, and fair resolution) [hereinafter Complex Litigation Project]. The proposal identified the
following substantive areas where complex multi-party, multi-forum litigation might call for issue
separation: antitrust, securities, products-liability, mass-disaster, copyright and patent, and contract
litigation. See id. cmt.c, at 114.
131. See, e.g., Miller v. New Jersey Transit Auth. Rail Ops., 160 F.R.D. 37, 39-41 (D.N.J. 1995)
(bifurcating personal injury claim resulting from contact with electrified train); Witherbee v. Honeywell,
Inc., 151 F.R.D. 27, 28-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (bifurcating personal injury claim arising out of water
heater explosion); Greening v. B.F. Goodrich Co., No. 90-C-2891, 1993 WL 134781, at * 1-4 (N.D. Ill.
April 23, 1993) (bifurcating wrongful death claims arising out of explosion of chemical storage tank);
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contract cases,' and employment cases.' The issues bifurcated in these
cases are varied, including affirmative defenses,'34 liability and damages,'35
and punitive damages.'36 The reasons for bifurcating are typical: to gain
efficiency,'37 to avoid prejudice, 38 orboth.'39 Thus, it would be unfair-and
Zofcin v. Dean, 144 F.R.D. 203, 204-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (bifurcating personal injury and wrongful
death claims arising out of car crash).
132. See, e.g., Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1995)
(breach of warranty); Raphaely Int'l, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 47,52 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(bifurcating breach of warranty issue from damages in shipping case, noting that it was the practice in
admiralty cases to bifurcate); Vadakin v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 748 F. Supp. 550, 555
(S.D. Ohio 1990) (bifurcating breach of contract issue from damages).
133. See, eg., Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 171-72 (6th Cir. 1993) (bifurcating in
gender-discrimination case); Brom v. Bozell, Jacobs, Kenyon &Eckhardt, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 686,689-
90 (N.D. II1. 1994) (bifurcating in age-discrimination case); Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267,
1271-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).
134. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F. Supp. 304,308 (D.D.C. 1996)
(bifurcating affirmative defenses from insurance coverage issues); Dixon v. Certainteed Corp., 166
F.RD. 487, 488-89 (D. Kan. 1996) (bifurcating whether plaintiff was statutory employee limited to
workers' compensation remedies); Greening, 1996 WL 134781, at *4 (bifurcating affirmative defenses
that injured plaintiffwas an "employee" limited to workers' compensation remedies).
135. See, e.g., Witherbee, 151 F.IRD. at 29-30; Brom, 867 F. Supp. at 690.
136. See, e.g., Scheufler v. General Host Corp., 895 F. Supp. 1411, 1414-15 (D. Kan. 1995); cf
Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 110 (4th Cir. 1991) (endorsing bifurcation of punitive
damages from liability and compensatory damages); Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d
277, 283 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that bifurcation of punitive damages is "preferred method"). One
defender of punitive-damage awards has suggested the use of bifurcation as a safeguard against
excessive or unjust awards. See Cynthia R. Mabry, Warning! The Manufacturer of This Product May
Have Engaged in Cover-Ups, Lies, and Concealment: Making the CaseforLimitless Punitive Awards in
Product Liability Lawsuits, 73 Ind. L.J. 187, 239 (1997).
137. See Brom, 867 F. Supp. at 690 (regarding extensive and complex damages evidence in age-
discrimination case); Vadakin, 748 F. Supp. at 555 (bifurcating breach of contract and damages because
damages evidence was "difficult and cumbersome" and would become moot ifplaintifffailed to prove a
breach of contract in first place).
138. See Witherbee, 151 F.RD. at 30 ("By separating the issues of liability and damages, the court
will minimize the risk that the defendants ... will be unfairly prejudiced by testimony relating to the
damages which involve extensive bum injuries sustained by [plaintiff]."); Zofcin v. Dean, 144 F.RD.
203,205 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that the evidence of damages posed "substantial risk of impairing the
jury's objectivity on the liability issue" in car accident case where plaintiff intended to offer "detailed
evidence of extreme pain and suffering, including buming flesh and screams of pain"); Lagudi v. Long
Island RLR Co., 775 F. Supp. 73,75 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (bifurcating liability and damages because ofrisk
of sympathy verdict); Buscemi, 736 F. Supp. at 1272 (bifurcating liability and damages in age-
discrimination case because of risk of sympathy verdict).
139. See Raposo v. Honda MotorCo., No. 92-CV-1087,1996 WL 63526, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
1996) (bifurcating liability and damages evidence in all-terrain vehicle products-liability action to avoid
prejudice to defendant from severity of plaintiff's injuries and to further economy in the event of a
defense verdict or mid-phase settlement); Scheufler, 895 F. Supp. at 1414 (splitting determination of
actual and punitive damages promotes efficiency and prevents prejudice); Greening, 1993 WL 13478 1,
at *3-4 (bifurcating affirmative defense that injured plaintiff was an "employee" limited to workers'
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inaccurate-to suggest that today's federal judges shun bifurcation
entirely.14
However, the presumption against bifurcation remains a very real and
substantial obstacle to bifurcation in ordinary cases. The presumption has
been invoked to deny bifurcation if the plaintiff stands any chance of
prevailing on liability.4' or if the second issue would take less than a week
to try. 142 Courts have invoked the presumption to deny bifurcation based on
the plaintiffs mere allegation that there will be overlapping evidence. 43
When the basis for bifurcation is prejudice, many judges cite the
presumption as requiring the movant to show an extraordinary risk of a
sympathy verdict,"4 sometimes asserting that ordinary prejudice can be
countered through limiting instructions. 4' Finally, some judges openly rely
on the presumption to avoid bifurcation even where bifurcation might
otherwise seem warranted for fear of taking one step too far down a slippery
compensation remedies for efficiency and to prejudice against defendant due to severity of plaintiff's
injuries).
140. There are judges that already take an aggressive approach to bifurcation. See, e.g., White v. SMI
of Pattison Ave., L.P., No. 92-1724, 1998 WL 633697, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1998) (noting that Judge
Weiner had bifurcated 64% of his cases during the preceding 14 months).
141. See Ayers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1163, 1165-66 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (denying
bifurcation because liability was not "so tenuous that it is likely the parties will not reach the issue of
damages"); Aldous v. Honda Motor Co., No. 94-CV-1090, 1996 WL 312189, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 30,
1996) (stating that projected savings contingent on defense liability verdict was "by no means
guaranteed"); Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assoc., 827 F. Supp. 233,246 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (requiring two trials
if plaintiff established liability).
142. See Aldous, 1996 WL 312189, at *2 (finding "three to four days" of potential trial savings
insufficient to support bifurcation of liability and damages); Thompson v. First Interstate Info. Sys., Inc.,
No. 4-91-CV-20104, 1992 WL 317572, at *5 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 28, 1992) (finding defendant failed to
show that "a significant amount of time would be saved by bifurcating the trial" even though damages
testimony would consist at minimum of testimony of six plaintiffs and one expert). An extreme example
is Samuels v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, No. 97-3448, 1998 WL 770624 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 1988),
where the court relied on the presumption to deny bifurcation of whether the plaintiff had timely filed an
administrative claim because the trial was only expected to last four to five days, despite the fact that a
decision on timeliness likely would have obviated most of that trial time. Id. at *2.
143. See Ake v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 877 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Aldous, 1996 WL
312189, at *2; Monaghan, 827 F. Supp. at 246 (noting inevitable overlap of testimony alone defeats the
claim ofjudicial economy).
144. See Monaghan, 827 F. Supp. at 246 ("[B]ifurcation, even in personal injury actions, is reserved
for truly extraordinary situations of undue prejudice."); see also Ayers, 941 F. Supp. at 1165 (noting
defendant must show more than usual amount of sympathy).
145. See Ake, 942 F. Supp. at 877; Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (N.D.
Ga. 1990); see also Hirschheimer v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., No. 94-CV-6155JFK, 1997
WL 528057, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1997) ("With regard to the sympathetic jurors issue ... the
Court will instruct the jury that sympathy for the Plaintiff is to play no part in their decision.").
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slope towards bifurcating all trials. " Of course, that just begs the question:
If considerations such as prejudice and efficiency do call for bifurcating
most trials, why does the legal community cling to the unitary-trial format
by refusing to step onto the slope? Stated otherwise, does the presumption
against bifurcation exist because it best serves the values of the civil jury
trial, or simply to perpetuate the primacy of the traditional unitary trial? The
rest of the Article seeks to answer these questions.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON BIFURCATION IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS
Before turning to the policy implications of bifurcation, it is necessary to
first explore the constitutional boundaries of issue separation. After all, if
the Constitution erects substantial requirements or prohibitions on
bifurcation in federal court, the wisdom of a rule-based presumption against
bifurcation is irrelevant. The obvious starting point is the Seventh
Amendment.'47 Because of its apparent effects on verdict outcomes,
bifurcation also requires a brief look at the Erie doctrine. 48 Ultimately,
neither the Seventh Amendment nor Erie justifies a presumption against
bifurcation. The Seventh Amendment, however, does provide important
instructions on how to separate issues to preserve the substance of the right
to jury trial.
A. The Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[1] the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and [2] no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law."'4 9 These two clauses are generally viewed as
146. See Monaghan, 827 F. Supp. at 246 (asserting that ordinary prejudice and sympathy not enough
because otherwise "the single trial of virtually any personal injury action arising from a violent crime
would require bifurcation"); Brown, 732 F. Supp. at 1171 (finding possibility of defense liability verdict
and risk that jury will sympathize with plaintiff insufficient to support bifurcation because they would
apply in any negligence action).
147. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
148. Erie R.1L Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). While the constitutional implications ofErie are
their own subject of debate, see Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 56 (4th ed. 1983)
(discussing whetherErie is constitutional doctrine), this Article assumes that the application ofa federal
bifurcation procedure in direct conflict with a state policy favoring unitary trials implicates the
federalism aspects of the Erie doctrine.
149. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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distinct. 50 The first clause, the Trial-by-Jury Clause, guarantees litigants in
federal courts the right initially to have their claims decided byjuries. '5 The
second clause, the Re-examination Clause, protects the trial-by-jury right by
preventing judges or later juries from second-guessing the first jury's
decision.
5 2
1. Preserving the Right to Trial by Jury: Gasoline Products Co. v.
Champlin Refining Co.
Almost every analysis of bifurcation under the Seventh Amendment
begins with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gasoline Products Co. v.
Champlin Refining Co.,'53 which addressed the constitutionality of a partial
remand after appeal.' 54 In that case, the Champlin Refining Company had
prevailed on a counterclaim against the Gasoline Products Company.'55 On
appeal, the First Circuit held that the jury's damage award on the
counterclaim could not stand because the trial court erred in the damage
instructions.'56 Instead of remanding the entire claim, the First Circuit left
intact the liability finding and remanded for re-trial only the measure of
damages.'57 Champlin wanted the court to reverse the entire verdict against
it on the counterclaim. Accordingly, Champlin argued that the proposed
partial remand was not a procedure available at common law and thus
violated the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.'58
The U.S. Supreme Court first rejected the argument that the Seventh
Amendment confined modem federal court procedure to English common-
150. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (distinguishing
trial-by-jury clause from re-examination clause).
151. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
152. See Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause,
83 Iowa L. Rev. 499, 516 (1998).
153. 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
154. See, e.g., Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, at 118 (discussing Gasoline Products);
Note, supra note 77, at 829 (same); Henderson et al., supra note 9, at 1679, 1683-84 (same); Woolley,
supra note 152, at 536-42.
155. See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 496. Gasoline Products had also prevailed on its claims, but
those claims were not appealed. See Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 39 F.2d 521,522 (1st
Cir. 1930), rev'd, 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
156. The trial court had erroneously instructed the jury that it could not award damages if it was "in
any degree uncertain" about them, whereas the prevailing standard required only "reasonable certainty."
Gasoline Products, 39 F.2d at 523.
157. See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 496.
158. See id. at 497.
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law trial practice." 9 Thus, the fact that partial remand departed with prior
practice did not render it unconstitutional per se."6° The Court held,
however, that the partial remand in that case did violate the Seventh
Amendment because the issue to be retried separately was not sufficiently
"distinct and separable from the others [such] that a trial of it alone may be
had without injustice."'' The original jury issued only a general verdict for
breach of contract, even though the plaintiffs proof involved a lengthy
series of negotiations and transactions which could have given rise to
different contracts at different times.-62 On remand, a second jury would
have to calculate damages for breach of contract, but nothing in the record
would tell that jury when the contract came into existence, what its terms
were, or when it was breached. 63 Thus, "the question of damages on the
counterclaim [was] so interwoven with that of liability that the former
[could not] be submitted to the jury independently of the latter without
confusion and uncertainty, which would amount to a denial of a fair
trial.' 6
4
Although Gasoline Products never mentions bifurcation, "[t]here is a
near universal consensus among the authorities that Gasoline Products
upholds the constitutionality of the bifurcation procedure."' 6 This
consensus stands on strong footing. First, by rejecting a static reading of the
Seventh Amendment, the Court threw open the doors for lower courts to
experiment with new trial procedures such as bifurcation. 166 Second, the
159. The Court explained:
All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for determination with
such instructions and guidance by the court as will afford opportunity for that consideration by the
jury which was secured by the rules goveming trials at common law. Beyond this, the Seventh
Amendment does not exact the retention of old forms ofprocedure.
Id. at 498 (internal citations omitted).
160. See id. at 498-99.
161. Id. at 500.
162. See id. at499-500.
163. See Woolley, supra note 152, at 540 (explaining that contract terms and breach were outside
scope of First Circuit's re-trial order).
164. Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 500.
165. Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, § 3.06 n.12, at 119; see generally 8 Moore's
Federal Practice, supra note 1, § 42.22 (discussing Seventh Amendment impact on biflurcation).
166. While the Court confirms that the right to trial by jury is one of substance over form and
encourages lower courts to experiment with new trial procedures, the text itselfsheds little light on what
the substance of trial by jury is. See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 498. The ensuing citations to Walker
v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Co. and Ex Parte Peterson leave little doubt that the
substance of the jury trial is factfinding. See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 498; Exparte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300,310 (1920) ("The limitation imposed by theAmendment is merely that enjoymentofthe right
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Court, by definition, held that the Trial-by-Jury Clause permits separate
consideration of separable issues. 16
7
Gasoline Products, however, does little to clarify when issues are
separable. The outcome of the case certainly did not turn on generally
applicable principles of issue separability. 68 The partial remand order
proposed to separate the issues of liability and damages.'69 However, the
Court did not base its reversal of the partial remand order on a finding that
the issues of liability and damages are inherently inseparable. Rather, it did
so because the first jury's general verdict did not establish crucial facts (for
example, the terms of the contract or when it was breached) that the second
jury needed in order to decide damages. 7 ' This problem had nothing to do
with inherent separabilty. Indeed, a remand of damages only would have
been proper if either: (1) the first jury had rendered a special verdict
identifying when the contract came into existence, its terms, and when it
was breached, or (2) the partial remand had been to the same jury. In either
situation, the remand jury would have had the information it needed to
calculate damages properly. Thus, the Court's actual holding suggests no
more than that, on these facts and at this stage of the litigation, separation
was improper because the first jury's general verdict knitted the issues of
liability and damages together in a way the second jury could not unravel.
The last paragraph of Gasoline Products contains two statements that
seem like they might be criteria for separability, but probably were not
intended as such. The Court stated that a partial remand is proper only if
"the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a
trial of it alone may be had without injustice."17' The Court then concluded
that the proposed partial remand was improper because damages and
of trial by jury be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury be not
interfered with."); Walkerv. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593,596 (1897) (finding aim of Seventh
Amendment "is not to preserve mere matters of form but substance of right. This requires that questions
of fact in common law actions shall be settled by a jury .... So long as this substance of right is
preserved the procedure by which this result shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the
legislature.").
167. Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 499 (deciding that Seventh Amendment was satisfied "even
though another and separable issue must be tried again").
168. The concept of separability "goes beyond the question of whether two juries are used." 9 Federal
Practice & Procedure, supra note 2, § 2391. In other words, a generally applicable principle of issue
separability would regulate separability in all settings, including those where a court ordered separate
trial of issues in a single (but segmented) proceeding to the same jury. See id.
169. See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 496.
170. See id. at 499-500.
171. Id. at 500.
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liability were "so interwoven" that they could not be tried separately
"without confusion and uncertainty."' 72 One could read these statements as
transcending the procedural posture and the facts of the case to define
generally applicable principles of separability. 73 But the Court did not
purport to articulate generally applicable principles of separability, and the
context of the decision counsels against that interpretation. 74
The Court's reference to "injustice" appears to address an issue unique to
partial remands. The precedent cited in this last paragraph of Gasoline
Products indicates that the "injustice" the Court was referring to concerned
errors in the unremanded portion of the verdict, and not errors stemming
from separation. In one of these cases, the plaintiff presented alternate
theories of liability, one of which was reversed on appeal. 7 A partial
remand order was improper in that case because it was unclear whether the
jury found liability based on the proper or improper theory.'76 In another
case, the Court held that partial remand was inappropriate because the
original jury verdict appeared to be a compromise verdict.'77 In two of the
other cases the Court cited as precedent, partial remands of liability could
not be ordered without causing "injustice" because errors in the liability
aspect of the trials had infected the juries' otherwise proper calculations of
damages. 78 The common thread running through all of these cases is that
the "injustice" that prevented the partial remand had to do with flaws in the
unremanded portion of the verdict, not the propriety of having the jury
decide the remanded portion of the case separately.
172 Id.
173. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290,308-09 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Many courts consider
the issue's ability to be tried separately, andiwithout injustice, to be the standard fordetermining whether
the Seventh Amendment has been violated.") (emphasis added); 9 Federal Practice and Procedure,
supra note 2, § 2391, at 514-15 ("[S]eparate trial of a particular issue cannot be ordered in the first
instance when the issue is so interwoven with the other issues in the case that it cannot be submitted to
the jury independently of the others without confusion and uncertainty.").
174. See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
175. See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 500 (citing American Locomotive Co. v. Harris, 239 F. 234,
240 (Ist Cir. 1917) (noting plaintiff relied on assumpsit and quantum meruit)).
176. See American Locomotive Co. v. Harris, 239 F. 234, 240 (Ist Cir. 1917). Presumably, the
problem in this case, like the defect in Gasoline Products, would have been obviated by a special
verdict, which would have told the court whether the jury had properly found liability.
177. See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 500 (citing Simmons v. Fish, 97 N.E. 102, 103, 105-06
(Mass. 1912)).
178. See Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 500 (citing McBride v. Huckins, 81 A. 528, 532-33 (N.H.
1911) and LeFebvre v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 123 A. 211, 218 (Vt. 1924)).
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The Court did not appear to have meant its reference to "confusion and
uncertainty" to be a generally applicable principle of separability either. At
that point of the opinion, the Court had finished making statements
regarding the law and was now applying the law of partial remands to the
facts of the case. 179 Read in its proper context, the Court's reference to
"confusion and uncertainty" sounds far more like a conclusion of fact (that
trying damages to a different jury would be confusing and uncertain in this
case) than a standard for issue separation generally.180
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not defined "separability," it is
difficult to know if the Trial-by-Jury Clause imposes any meaningful limits
on issue separation.' This Article does not need to determine the outer
limits of separability, however, because it does not urge courts to separate
issues to those limits. Indeed, the thesis of this Article is quite the opposite:
this Article urges a more aggressive use of ordinary issue separation in
ordinary cases. Gasoline Products already clarifies that the U.S. Supreme
Court thinks liability and damages are separable for trial, even if they
cannot always be separated after the fact on appeal.'12 Moreover, Rule
42(b), like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, emanates from the
179. See id.
180. In many ways, this part of Gasoline Products reads more like a Fifth Amendment procedural due
process case than a Seventh Amendment Trial-by-Jury Clause case. Interestingly, the Court states that
the "confusion and uncertainty" that would result from the proposed partial remand "would amount to a
denial of a fair trial." Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 500. To the extent Gasoline Products means only
that jury verdicts are infirm when they are based on inadequate information, it sounds like "a specialized
application of a general due process concern for the accuracy of the decisionmaking process." Woolley,
supra note 154, at 538; see also Bedecarr6, supra note 6, at 129 (noting Seventh Amendment violated
when issue separation results in jury being given incomplete information). The Trial-by-Jury Clause and
the Due Process Clause, however, serve distinct purposes. The Trial-by-Jury Clause ensures that juries
will decide disputed facts. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. The Due Process Clause, on the
other hand, protects litigants from arbitrary outcomes. See Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 68, 88-89 (1981) (explaining that Due
Process Clause guarantees capable factfinder and rational verdict). Indeed, the clauses can be
antagonistic in complex litigation, where the jury trial right may conflict with rational decision making
because the facts, while abundantly supplied, are simply too complex to be understood by layjurors. See.
e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause trumped Seventh Amendment where case was too complex for lay jury
to decide rationally).
181. Even if the "without injustice" and "without confusion and uncertainty" standards did define
separability (as a function of either the Seventh Amendment or Due Process), they are so subjective,
value-laden, and imprecise that it is hard to see how they would significantly clarify the issue or lead to
predictable outcomes.
182. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
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Court.' It seems highly unlikely that the Court would promulgate a
procedural rule authorizing issue separation if it thought that rule would
violate the Constitution when put to its basic use.
2. Preventing Re-examination
The Re-examination Clause' also fails to support the presumption
against bifurcation. For years, courts have scrutinized bifurcation under the
Re-examination Clause, finding that the "right to jury trial includes the right
to have a single issue decided one time by a single jury."' Fundamentally,
the Re-examination Clause applies only when different juries decide the
separated issues. 6 In mass-tort cases involving hundreds or thousands of
plaintiffs, the courts must use different juries for practical and logistical
reasons.'87 The thrust of this Article, however, is not to justify bifurcation in
mass-tort cases (where it is already common),'88 but to launch bifurcation
into the procedural mainstream. In most ordinary single-plaintiff cases, the
court will have the same jury hear all of the issues for efficiency reasons. 9
183. The Federal Rules are drafted and amended under the auspices of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
then submits them to Congress for approval. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072-74.
184. The Seventh Amendment provides that "no fact tried by ajury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. Const. amend. VII.
185. Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass'n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1025 (5th Cir. 1983); see also
Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[I]nherent in the Seventh
Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury is the general right of a litigant to have only one jury pass on a
common issue of fact."); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203,204 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(same).
186. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rover Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995); 9 Federal Practice and
Procedure, supra note 2, § 2391, at 512-13.
187. After first-phase resolution of the common issue, the individual plaintiffs typically go elsewhere
for the individualized phases of their own lawsuits. See Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, at
125 (noting that remanded individual plaintiffs moved to transferor court after resolving common
issues). Those plaintiffs necessarily would get different juries. Even as to the plaintiffs who might
choose to remain in the first phase court, it seems unlikely that the same jury would be impaneled in
perpetuity to hear and decide all of those individual trials.
188. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
189. Where possible, using the same jury is the preferred practice. See 9 Federal Practice and
Procedure, supra note 2, § 2391, at 512. To start, a second jury would require new voir dire. More
importantly, re-using the firstjury is likely to make the second-issue phase proceed much fasterbecause
thatjury will already be educated about the case, is likely to be familiar with some of the witnesses, and
may even have heard some of the second-phase evidence. Accordingly, the litigants often will be able to
proceed directly with second-phase evidence. Cf CivilJury, supra note 48, at 1531 (noting that use of
same jury minimizes duplication of testimony).
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Thus, in the vast majority of cases, bifurcation will not even pose a risk of
re-examination.
Nor does the risk of re-examination justify a presumption against
bifurcation in cases involving separate juries. Like Rule 42(b), many
procedural rules could be used in a manner that violates the Seventh
Amendment. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governing
summary judgment could be used in a manner that violates the Trial-by-
Jury Clause if a judge uses it in a way that deprives a litigant of her right to
have contested material facts resolved by ajury.90 That risk, however, does
not give rise to a presumption against the use of summary judgment
methodology, but rather requires the courts to be attentive to its application.
The risk of re-examination presented when separate juries hear bifurcated
issues calls for sound case management, not avoidance of the procedure.
The Re-examination Clause does not prohibit different juries from hearing
the same evidence; it only prohibits different juries from deciding the same
issue.'9' The federal courts can manage the risk of re-examination by taking
a few simple precautions.' 92 First, the court needs to carefully define the
roles of the two juries so that the first jury does not decide issues within the
prerogative of the second jury.' 93 Second, the court must carefully craft the
190. See 10A Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2714, at 250-51 (noting federal courts
must "take great care" to assure that summary-judgment procedure does not violate to trial-by-jury
right).
191. See Woolley, supra note 154, at 531-32. As the Fifth Circuit recently stated:
The existence of common factual issues is to be distinguished from the existence of overlapping
evidence. For purposes of the Seventh Amendment, the question is whether factual issues overlap,
thus requiring one trier-of-fact to decide a disputed issue that must be decided by a subsequent jury,
not whether the two fact-finders will merely have to consider similar evidence ....
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,423 n.21 (5th Cir. 1998); see also EEOC v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203,205 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (noting that in bifurcated, multi-plaintiff, pattern-
and-practice age-discrimination case, phase-one determination that employer engaged in pattern and
practice of discrimination was separate issue from phase-two determination of whether that pattern or
practice was cause of discrimination toward individual plaintiffs, despite likelihood of substantial
evidentiary overlap).
192. For an excellent overall discussion of this subject and application of the necessary management
principles, see In Re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 588-89 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
193. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444,452 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument
that second jury re-examined proximate cause because "[t]he first jury did not determine the
foreseeability of plaintiffs' alleged or prospective injuries, and instead determined only whether the
plaintiffs were exposed to PCBs and injured from that exposure."); see also EEOC v. Foster Wheeler
Constructors, Inc., No. 98-C-1601, 1999 WL 528200, at *3 (N.D. 11. July 13, 1999) (bifurcating
existence of hostile work environment from individual injury and damages in class-action hostile-work-
environment case and noting that "a well-constructed bifurcation scheme, used in tandem with clear
instructions to the juries can delineate the roles of the two juries in order to avoid reexamination of any
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verdict form for the first jury so that the second jury knows what has been
decided already.' 94 If the first jury makes sufficiently detailed findings,
those findings are then akin to instructions for the second jury to follow."
In the federal courts, "the law presumes almost without exception that ajury
will follow its instructions."' 9' If the second jury does not follow these
instructions, the judge can throw out the second jury's verdict and retry the
second phase issue." Just as there is always a risk that ajudge will violate
the Trial-by-Jury Clause when granting summary judgment, there is also
always a risk that a second jury will violate the Re-examination Clause by
not following the first jury's instructions. That risk, however, does not
warrant a presumption against bifurcating under Rule 42(b) in the first
place. 98
factual issues"). The Paoli court appears to have been meticulous in its efforts to keep the issues
separate: "The district court did not instruct the jury on foreseeability, neither the plaintiffs nor the
defendants requested an instruction on that issue, and the jury interrogatories did not refer to the
foreseeability of the alleged harms." 113 F.3d at 452 n.5. Problems arise only when the court fails to
either create or preserve issue boundaries. See In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d
1144, 1182-84 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting court violated Seventh Amendment in bifurcated antitrust action
when first juy decided fact of antitrust injury by allowing defendant to argue same issue to secondjury).
194. In passing on a bifurcated antitrust class action, Judge Higginbotham put it this way:
[S]eparating liability and damages must be done in a manner that does not allow the jury in phase
two to determine again the damages established in phase one. The art of bifurcation is then
ultimately the art of devising interrogatories for submission under Rule 49 that will elicit ajury
answer in essentially formulaic terms.
Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass'n. 721 F.2d 1019, 1025 (5th Cir. 1984). The Second
Circuit, for example, recently reversed the plaintiffs' verdicts in the 25-year-old Attica riot litigation
because the verdict form for phase one of the trial on liability did not identify the specific unlawful acts
for which the second jury in the damages phase awarded damages. See Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d
252,268-69 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit characterized this as a Re-examination Clause violation
because it felt that the second jury necessarily had to re-determine which of the defendants' acts were
unlawful. See id The court could as easily have characterized this as a Trial-by-Jury Clause violation in
the Gasoline Products mold because the damages jury was asked to calculate damages for unidentified
acts.
195. See Woolley, supra note 154, at 525 ("If the first jury renders a sufficiently detailed verdict, later
juries can be instructed to apply the first jury's findings."). A firstjury's specific instructions from one
stage of the trial should receive at least as much, if not more, respect from the second jury than abstract
standards of law. See id at 526.
196. i
197. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (authorizing new trial "on all or part of the issues").
198. The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in In re Rhone-Poulenc suggested that re-examination
problems were inevitable when one jury decides causation and a second jury decides related issues such
as proximate causation or comparative negligence. 51 F.3d 293, 1303(7th Cir. 1995) (decertifying Rule
23(c)(4) issue class to determine whether blood-solid manufacturers were negligent in not screening for
HIV soon enough); see also Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996)
(denying certification of nicotine-dependent tobacco smokers class due to risk of re-examination); Arch
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B. Bifurcation and the Erie Doctrine
Some courts and commentators have raised the Erie doctrine' as
another constitutional doctrine that might impact bifurcation in federal
courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Professor Weinstein, writing in 1961,
worried that the "routine" bifurcation contemplated by Northern District of
Illinois Local Rule 21 interfered with the jury's power to modify the law.2
Specifically, he was concerned that a jury trying a state-law claim in state
court would be free to apply de facto comparative negligence (that is, by
rejecting contributory negligence but discounting damages) whereas
bifurcation in the federal court would effectively deprive a federal jury
trying an identical state law claim of a comparative-negligence rule of
decision. 20 ' He concluded that Local Rule 21 was "substantive" because it
had a "substantial impact on the law of contributory negligence.
202
Although Professor Weinstein's position may have been correct under
the Erie doctrine of 1961,203 Rule 42(b) almost certainly passes muster
v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (following Castano). The effect of
Rhone-Poulenc is debatable. First, the court did not actually find a violation of the Re-examination
Clause. Rather, it issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial judge to decertify the common-issue
classes because the class structure was not superior, in part because of the risk of re-examination. See
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299 (stating that risk of re-examination was one of three concerns Seventh
Circuit had, "none of them necessarily sufficient in itself but cumulatively compelling"); see also
Castano, 84 F.3d at 751 ("The risk of... reevaluation is so great that class treatment can hardly be said
to be superior to individual adjudication."). Second, provided the first jury specified the basis for its
finding of negligence, it is unclear why a second jury could not use that verdict, as an instruction, in
ascertaining proximate cause or comparative negligence. See Laurie C. Uustal, Note, In the Matter of
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer: Shielding Defendants UnderRule 23,51 U. Miami L. Rev. 1247, 1271-72 (1997)
(analyzing overlap between negligence and proximate cause and concluding that issues would be
"completely separate"). Indeed, the Castano court acknowledged that the only way a second jury's
decision on comparative fault could be inherently inconsistent with a first jury's determination that the
defendant was negligent would be to apportion 100% of the fault to the plaintiff. 84 F.3d at 751.
199. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine holds that "federal courts
sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law." Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Gasperini, however,
classifying a rule of law as substantive or procedural "is something of a challenging endeavor." 518 U.S.
at 427.
200. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 833-36. The Erie doctrine remains a part of bifurcation analysis to
this day. See, e.g., Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, § 3.06 cmt. f, at 151 (discussing Erie
doctrine as a limitation on bifurcation in consolidated complex litigation); Smith, supra note 29, at 665
(discussing Erie).
201. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 834-35.
202. Id. at 836.
203. At the time, all Erie cases were still guided by the "outcome determinative" test, see Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (stating that "outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same"), subject to countervailing federal interests, see Byrd v. Blue Ridge
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under the modem Erie doctrine. With Hanna v. Plumer,2 4 the U.S.
Supreme Court created a practically irrebutable presumption that federal
statutes and the federal rules, if on point, will supplant conflicting state
procedures. 5 Today, one can almost reflexively respond that bifurcation
under Rule 42(b) does not contravene the Erie doctrine because it is part of
the federal rules." 6 Indeed, since Hanna, there is no reported opinion where
a federal court has declined to invoke Rule 42(b) because of a conflicting
state bifurcation rule or practice.0 7 In fact, one federal court bifurcated a
state law claim even though the state's highest court had declared
bifurcation to be contrary to the state's 'long standing policy and
practice. '
' 208
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525,537(1958). It is entirely plausible that courts in the early 1960s would
have found the significant shift in plaintiffs' success rates identified by Judge Weinstein could have been
found to be "outcome determinative." But see Moss v. Associated Trans., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 27 (6th Cir.
1965) (rejecting Erie challenge to bifurcation because there was "no such assurance, or even likelihood,
of different outcomes" between a bifurcated and unitary trial). If federal courts had found bifurcation to
be outcome determinative, the countervailing federal interest in efficiency might have been accorded less
weight because of the belief that bifurcation, while constitutional, does alter the jury's traditional role.
Cf Weinstein, supra note 29, at 836 (noting "doubt about the outcome ofa collision between the federal
policy of Erie and the federal policy favoring the jury system").
204. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
205. l1 at 472-73; see also Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, § 124.02[2].
206. Bifurcation certainly regulates procedure, see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464, and Rule 42(b) is
sufficiently broad to supplant a contrary state rule. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
29-31 (1988) (analyzing Erie implications of federal venue transfer statute).
207. Most cases have involved a state rule against bifurcation. See Shugart v. Central Rural Elec.
Coop., 110 F.3d 1501, 1504(10th Cir. 1997) (bifurcating punitive damages from actual damages despite
contrary Oklahoma rule); Oulds v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1993)
(bifurcating insurance-coverage and bad-faith claims despite contrary Oklahoma Supreme Court
precedent); Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying
discretionary Rule 42(b) rather than mandatory state rule); Sellers v. Baisier, 792 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.
1986) (bifurcating liability and damages in medical-malpractice case despite contrary state-law practice);
Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 259,262 (5th Cir. 1984) (bifurcating liability and damages in
personal-injury suit despite contrary Texas Supreme Court precedent); In re Breast Implant Cases, 942
F. Supp. 958,962-63 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting bifurcation governed by federal standard, but
noting that state rule appeared consistent and therefore did not present actual Erie conflict); Cook v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 169 F.R.D. 359, 361 n.1 (D. Nev. 1996) (noting that request to bifurcate
coverage and bad-faith claims was governed by federal rather than state law); Robinson v. Adco Metals,
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 826, 829 (D. Del. 1987) (bifurcating claims against insurer from those against other
defendants without regard to state law). In one case, the court exercised its discretion underRule 42(b) to
decline bifurcation despite a state rule of mandatory bifurcation. See Hamm v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (denying motion to bifurcate amount of punitive
damages from liability and culpability for punitive damages despite contrary California rule mandating
bifurcation).
208. Rosales, 726 F.2d at 261 (quoting Iley v. Hughes, 311 S.W.2d 648,651 (Tex. 1958)).
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The presumption against bifurcation in federal court would not be
justified even if bifurcation ran afoul of the Erie doctrine. First, the
presumption against bifurcation is applied to all cases in federal court,
including cases involving only federal questions.2" The Erie doctrine,
which posits that federal courts sitting in diversity must defer to the
substantive laws of the states in which they are located,"' cannot sustain a
presumption when applied to federal-question cases. Second, even in
diversity cases, a presumption against bifurcation is inconsistent with Erie
to the extent that the state trial practice does not have such a presumption. 21
In short, if the Erie doctrine should play any role in bifurcation under Rule
42(b), it would abolish any presumption against bifurcation in diversity
cases and require federal courts to defer to the prevailing state practice.
The most enduring part of Professor Weinstein's critique of Local Rule
21 was that guidelines on bifurcation in federal courts should come from
Congress." 2 To this day, Hanna affords no shelter to local rules or practices
that threaten state autonomy.2 3 The possibility of Erie scrutiny highlights
the need to address bifurcation standards at the national level so that any
alterations could proceed under the largely Erie-proof authority of the
federal rules.
209. See, e.g., Novopharm Ltd. v. Topharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (applying
presumption to patent infringement); Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (applying presumption to age discrimination).
210. See supra note 199; see generally Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, § 124.01 [ 1].
211. New York, for example, encourages bifurcating liability and damages in personal-injury cases.
See N.Y. Uniform Rule § 202.42 (2000). Similarly, many states encourage-or even require-
bifurcating punitive-damage issues. See James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and
Developments, 14 Rev. Litig. 419, 446-53 (1995).
212. Professor Weinstein argued that submitting rules for legislative approval conveyed the
"assurance that 'basic procedural innovations shall be introduced only after mature consideration of
informed opinion from all relevant quarters."' Weinstein, supra note 29, at 839 (quoting Minerv. Atlass,
363 U.S. 641,650 (1960)). He felt that local rules came with no such guarantees. See id. It is interesting
to note that the recent experience with the Civil Justice Reform Act has again galvanized the view that
procedural reform is best accomplished at the national level. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform
Sunset, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 547, 617 ("The multiple phases of review and revision.., and its provision
for substantial public participation ... insure that the amendments adopted are clear, fair, and responsive
to the needs of all participants in federal civil litigation."). Nevertheless, even the national rule-making
process has come under criticism for being too substantively powerful. See generally Robert G. Bone,
The Process ofMaking Process: Court Rulemaking. Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency,
87 Geo. L.J. 887, 909-10 (discussing criticism of procedural rules based on their substantive effects).
213. See, e.g., Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco, Inc., 123 F.3d 261,264 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997) (declining to
extend Hanna deference to local rule on fee-shifting).
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III. NO ROUTINE BIFURCATION: IS THERE POLICY BEHIND
THE PRESUMPTION?
Bifurcation strikes at the heart of many of the fundamental policies
associated with civil jury trials because it affects how juries decide cases.
Indeed, one of the earliest concerns among scholars was empirical data
showing that, at least in personal injury cases,juries in bifurcated trials were
less likely to find liability than their counterparts in unitary trials." 4 For
many, this impact alone might be sufficient cause to avoid bifurcation." 5
The reasons underlying this shift in verdict outcomes evoke their own
policy issues. Commentators generally agree that the elimination of
sympathy accounts for much of the shift in verdict outcomes.2t6 What the
scholars do not agree about is whether that effect is good or bad. Was
Professor Weinstein right when he said that the value ofjuries is to temper
the law based on a community sense of fairness,217 or was Judge Miner right
when he said that eliminating "sympathy, prejudice and other improper
pressures from jury trials ... [is] fundamental in the true administration of
justice"?" 8 Alternatively, might the separation of issues hinder jury
performance in other ways, such as impairing attentiveness, comprehension,
or decision making? Any of these effects, if substantial, could justify a
presumption in favor of unitary trials and against bifurcation.
A. The Impact of Bifurcation on Verdicts: A Mixed Blessing for Both
Sides
Many people view bifurcation as pro-defendant because they believe that
defendants have a better overall win rate in bifurcated trials than in unitary
214. See infra notes219-40 and accompanying text.
215. See Wright, supra note 29, at 747 (stating that decrease in plaintiffs' verdicts suggested that
bifurcation was "too heroic a cure for the problem of delay") (internal quotations omitted). Later
commentators continue this theme. See Granholm & Richards, supra note 29, at 513 ('Bircation...
appears to tilt the scales ofjustice in favor of defendants.").
216. See Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, at 120.
There also is little debate that bifurcation... favors defendants because it deprives plaintiffs of the
ability to evoke jury sympathy by presenting evidence on damage issues before liability is decided.
Studies indicate that juries who are moved by compassion for the injured victim tend to fuse
liability and damages in favor of the plaintiff.
Il
217. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 832.
218. O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577,585 (N.D. Iil. 1960).
Washington Law Review Vol. 75:705, 2000
trials.219 This perception arose out of the Zeisel and Callahan study, which
concluded that plaintiffs prevailed 66% of the time in unitary trials
compared to only 44% of the time in bifurcated trials.20 While these results
were not conclusive due to possible selection effects,22' they provided
strong evidence that bifurcation was pro-defendant in the sense that
bifurcated trials resulted in fewer plaintiff victories overall.
Two more recent studies seem to confirm this effect. A 1990 study by
Horowitz and Bordens found that mock juries were less likely to find for
plaintiffs on causation or liability when the trial was bifurcated. In that
study, for example, 100% of the mock juries found for the plaintiff in the
unitary trial settings, but that number dropped to 74.3% when the trial was
bifurcated. 23 Similarly, the mock juries found that the plaintiff had
219. See, e.g., Doyle W. Curry & Rosemary T. Snider, Bifurcated Trials: How to Avoid Them-How
to Win Them, 24 Trial 47 (1988) (noting that plaintiffs win less when the trial is bifircated and advising
plaintiffs to "develop a strategy to oppose bifurcation").
220. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1612 tbl.2. In the unitary trials, plaintiffs won at trial in
42% of the cases and reached settlement-after the start of the case but before the jury rendered its
verdict-in 24% of the cases, for a total "prevail" rate of 66%. See id. In the bifurcated trials, plaintiffs
won at trial only 12% of the cases but reached settlement in 32% of the cases, for a total prevail rate of
44%. See id. Qualitatively, one cannot call settlements "victories" for either side without knowing more,
such as the amount of the settlement and the relative merits of the case. However, this Article assumes
that settlements, in the aggregate if not individually, are sufficiently meaningful tojustify saying that the
plaintiff "prevailed." Cf Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 849, 872 (1998) (including settlements in calculating plaintiff "prevail
rates").
221. The Zeisel and Callahan study analyzed real case figures from the Northem District of Illinois
applying Local Rule 21, which promoted bifurcation but ultimately left it to the discretion of the trial
judge. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1608-09. While Zeisel and Callahan were able to factor out
selection effects in determining whether bifurcation saved trial time, it remains possible that the judges'
bifurcation decisions were influenced by whether they thought the plaintiff would prevail. See id. at
1613-16. Thus, the actual effect of bifurcation on plaintiffoutcomes could be more or less. See Vidmar,
supra note 220, at 872; see generally Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and RemovalJurisdiction, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 581,
588-92 (1998) (discussing selection effects on empirical outcome data).
222. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 47, at 281-82. The study consisted ofhaving 66 six-person
juries view a four-hour audiotape and slide presentation of a mock multi-plaintifftoxic-tort trial. See id.
at 274-75. The trial consisted of opening statements, initial instructions, presentation of liability
evidence, presentation of causation evidence, presentation ofdamage evidence, examination and cross-
examination of all witnesses, closing statements, and final instructions to the jury. See id. at 275. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant chemical company had discharged pollutants into their ecosystem,
that they had ingested these pollutants, and that the pollutants caused both physical and psychological
injuries. See id. The alleged physical injuries were moderate, ranging from skin rash to high blood
pressure; the alleged psychological injuries were all a variant of "cancerphobia"--the fear that they
already had an undiagnosed cancer or would develop some form of cancer in the future. Id.
223. See id. at 278.
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established general causation in 85.4% of the unitary trials, but found
general causation in only 68.6% of the bifurcated trials. 4 The most striking
differences arose when juries were given only one issue to decide.' When
causation was the sole issue to be decided, 87.5% of the unitary trial juries
found for the plaintiff, while only 25% of the bifurcated trial juries found
for the plaintiff after hearing just the causation component of the trial. 6
Similarly, when liability was the sole issue to be decided, 100% of the
unitary trial juries found for the plaintiff, while only 62.5% of the bifurcated
trial juries found for the plaintiff after hearing just the liability component
of the trial. 27 Based on the audiotaped deliberations, the authors of the
study explained these results by stating that the juries in the unitary trials
appeared to use damages evidence to support their substantive decisions,
particularly causation."
Another recent study led by Stephan Landsman yielded similar results. 9
The participants in this study watched a videotaped mock trial designed to
mirror an asbestos lawsuit." The purpose of the study was to measure the
effect, if any, of bifurcating the liability for and amount of punitive
damages from the jury's determination of compensatory liability and
damages. 3 Thus, approximately half of the participants heard and decided
compensatory liability and damages and punitive liability and damages in a
single unitary proceeding. 2 The other half of the participants first heard
and decided compensatory liability and damages only; participants who
224. See id at 277.
225. To create comparison groups with the bifurcated trial groups, some of the unitary trial juries
were asked to decide only certain issues. See id. at 272. These juries, however, still heard the same
amount of evidence. See i.
226. See id. at 278.
227. See id
228. See id at 282. The authors found it intriguing that, when the juries were asked to decide only
liability, the figures jumped from 62.5% in bifurcated trials to 87.5% in unitary trials. Based on the
estimate by a panel of neutral professors that the liability evidence was "moderately favorable" to the
plaintiffs the authors suggested that the 62.5% from the bifurcated trials appeared consistent with the
merits, implying that the results from the unitary trials were inflated relative to the merits. Id. at 276,
282. Based on the small samples to compare, however, the authors stopped short of drawing any formal
conclusions. See id.
229. See Landsman et al., supra note 7, at 308.
230. The lawsuit actually involved a fictional product called "beryllium," which the experimenters
substituted for asbestos because of concern the participants might find an asbestos case stale or might
have preconceived views. See id In all other respects, the lawsuit looked and felt like a typical asbestos
case. See id. at 309-310.
231. See id. at 308-09.
232. Seeid. at 311, 314 tb.2.
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found for the defendant were done, while the participants who found for the
plaintiff then heard and decided punitive liability and damages.233 The study
also varied the strength of the plaintiffs liability case from weak to
moderate within the unitary and bifurcated trial groups. 34 Thus, the study
could compare the effect of bifurcating punitive damage issues in weak and
moderate compensatory liability cases.235
Again, the results showed that bifurcation does affect liability outcomes.
The participants found the chemical company liable only 42.8% of the time
in bifurcated cases, but found the company liable in 55.2% of the unitary
trials.236 Comparing the weak unitary cases with the strong bifurcated cases
yields an especially eye-catching result. The jurors found compensatory
liability in 40.6% of the weak, bifurcated cases.237 When the evidence of
compensatory liability was strengthened from weak to moderate, the
plaintiffs success rate in the bifurcated case rose to 45.1%.238 But when the
weak case was presented in a unitary trial, the plaintiffs success rose to
approximately 48%.239 Thus, in terms of increasing the likelihood of
winning, plaintiffs did better by securing a unitary trial of the compensatory
and punitive issues than by presenting a stronger case for compensatory
liability.240
233. See id. at 311-12,314 tbl.2.
234. Seeid. at311.
235. "The basic design of the study was a 2 X 2 factorial that tested the impact of bifurcation across
and within variations in the strength of the plaintiff's case on liability." Id. at 312. The study also sought
to test the effect of varying the defendant's net worth, but only did so against the unitary trial set since,
by definition, net-worth evidence cannot alter liability outcomes in bifurcated trials because it is
presented only after a finding of liability. See id. at 312. It remains possible, however, that bifurcation
could alter ajury's use of a defendant's net worth in deciding whether to award punitive damages and, if
so, in what amount. Nevertheless, all of the data relevant to the effect of bifurcation was derived from
test groups in which the defendant was given similar worth. For a specific description of the study, see
id. at 311-13.
236. This is an average comparing unitary versus bifurcated trials across the different variants of
strength of case and defendant net worth. See id. at 316. The largest impact ofbifurcation occurred in the
moderate-strength cases, where liability jumped from 45.1% in bifurcated cases to 60.9% in unitary/high
net-worth cases and 63.4% in unitary/low net-worth cases. See id. at 317.
237. See id. at 317 tbl.3.
238. See id.
239. The plaintiff prevailed in 47.3% of the weak/unitary cases where the defendant had low net
worth, and in 49.1% of the weak/unitary cases where the defendant had high net worth, for an
approximate average of 48%. See id.
240. The study randomly assigned participants to decide the case alone or as part ofajury to test the
impact of deliberations. See id. at 313. While the individual jurors were affected by trial structure, the
juries deliberating as a group were not. The only difference between outcomes in the unitary and
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The outcome shift detected in these studies, however, falls short of
establishing that bifurcation is inherently or categorically pro-defendant for
two reasons. First, the studies are not representative of the federal docket
because they focus narrowly on personal-injury litigation. Second, even in
the personal-injury context, the newer studies suggest that bifurcation may
have a pro-plaintiff effect on damages that offsets its pro-defendant effect
on liability.
The existing bifurcation studies are focused too narrowly on one type of
case-personal-injury litigation-to support the categorical conclusion that
bifurcation is pro-defendant. Although the studies to date all have been
based on personal-injury or similar tort claims," most federal court jury
trials occur in non-personal-injury cases. For the twelve-month period
ending March 31, 1999, the federal courts conducted 4229 jury trials.242
Only 1214 of those trials were tort actions. 243 Thus, more than 3000-
almost 75/o-of the federal court jury trials were non-tort cases. For
example, the federal courts conducted jury trials in 485 contract cases, 978
employment civil-rights cases, 739 other civil-rights cases, and 347 prisoner
civil-rights cases.2' No studies to date have demonstrated any pro-
defendant bias for this 75% of the federal docket.
The personal-injury case studies do not support extrapolating an outcome
shift to other types of cases.245 In personal injury cases, the outcome shift
appears to result from jurors feeling sympathy for the plaintiff after hearing
about the plaintiff's injuries.2  In non-personal injury cases, the damages
evidence may not generate any sympathy at all, or might even generate
antipathy toward the plaintiff. In employment-discrimination cases, for
example, the evidence regarding lost wages would not seem to generate the
bifurcated trials when presented to a full jury was that the unitary trials yielded many more hung juries.
See id. at 322 & tbl.5.
241. See Horowitz& Bordens, supra note 47, at 275 (studying mock toxic-tort trial); Landsman et al.,
supra note 7, at 309 (studying mock asbestos trial); Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1609 (studying
personal-injury cases).
242. SeeAdministrativeOfficeoftheU.S. Courts, Federal Judicial CaseloadStatisticsMar. 31,1999
tbl.C-4.
243. There were 1039 diversity tort cases, 162 federal-question tort cases, and 13 other tort cases
involving the United States as a litigant. See id.
244. See id. As with the figures for tort actions, the numbers aggregate the figures in Table C-4 for
United States cases, federal-question cases, and diversity-of-citizenship cases. See id.
245. Cf Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, § 3.06 at 120 ("[M]ost of the cautions against
severance, as well as the data on how bifurcation has worked, are limited to the personal injury area.").
246. See Bornstein, supra note 55, at 1485; Edith Greene et al., The Effects oflnjury Severity on Jury
Negligence Decisions, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 675, 689-90 (1999).
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same sympathy as evidence regarding physical injury. Indeed, since fired
employees generally must mitigate their damages by securing other
employment, 47 higher damages correlate with continued unemployment.
This might lead the jury to think less of the plaintiff if the jury views the
plaintiff's failure to find a new job as evidence that the employee is not a
good worker or is not serious about working. Damages evidence in breach-
of-contract cases similarly lacks the same sympathy quotient as evidence
regarding physical injuries. Because sympathy appears to drive the outcome
shift in the personal injury cases, there is good reason to doubt that the less
sympathetic claims will yield a similar outcome shift.
The "pro-defendant" label may be unwarranted even where the outcome
shift is present. Although the studies to date consistently show that
personal-injury plaintiffs win fewer liability verdicts when the case is
bifurcated, 48 win/loss ratios may give an incomplete picture of the impact
of bifurcation. Specifically, bifurcation may have a countervailing pro-
plaintiff effect on the size of damages awards.
Anecdotal evidence of a pro-plaintiff damages shift appeared shortly
after the Northern District of Illinois adopted Local Rule 2 1. One judge, for
example, reported that the initial opposition to Local Rule 21249 soon
subsided when the plaintiffs' bar realized that its damage awards were
rising.250 More recently, two studies added empirical support to the idea
that, once liability is fixed, bifurcation can "switch sides" and become "pro-
plaintiff."
In the mock toxic-tort study performed by Horowitz and Borden, mock
jurors first decided whether a chemical company was liable for injuries to
the plaintiffs caused by alleged pollution and, if so, awarded damages.2
While bifurcation favored the defendants at the liability stage,252 the tables
turned dramatically once liability was established, with average damage
247. See Charles R. Richey, Manual on Employment Discrimination Law and Civil Rights Actions in
Federal Court § 1.195 (2d ed. 2000).
248. See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Corboy, supra note 29, at 1023 ("Until evidence is presented which is much more
persuasive than that which has been shown, courts... should not promiscuously separate issues of
liability from those of damages in negligence actions.").
250. See Richard S. Miller, A Program for the Elimination of the Hardships ofLitigation Delay, 27
Ohio St. L.J. 402, 418 n.44 (1966) (citing 1962 address by the Hon. Bernard M. Decker of the Circuit
Court of Illinois).
251. See supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
252. The plaintiffs established liability in all of the unitary trials but in only 62.5% of the bifurcated
trials. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 47, at 278.
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awards jumping from $274,000 in the unitary trials to $429,000 in the
bifurcated trials. 3 Due to the structure of the study, the authors could not
determine whether the difference reflected a pro-plaintiff bias once liability
was established or simply the absence of compromise verdicts that would
bring down the average.' The authors did conclude, however, that
bifurcation was a "double-edged sword for the defendants' bar" in that
defendants would win more cases at the liability stage but pay much larger
damage awards if they lost. 5
The Landsman study (the mock beryllium/asbestos trial)256 adds yet
another wrinkle. Bifurcation reduced the incidence of plaintiffs' liability
judgments in that study as well; indeed, the structure of the trial had more
impact than the strength of the plaintiff's case.257 Once again, the tables
turned at the damages stage, this time with respect to punitive damages."
First, while unitary trials in which the defendant was found liable resulted in
punitive damages only 75.3% of the time, the bifurcated trials in which
liability was established resulted in punitive damages 92% of the time.259
Second, the punitive-damage awards in the bifurcated trials were two- to
four-times larger than those in the unitary trials.2' The results of this study
cannot be dismissed as a function of omitting compromise verdicts. Even
after taking into account all of the possible outcomes including cases where
the defendant wins on liability or escapes punitive damages entirely, the
average expected loss for the defendant was greater in bifurcated trials.26'
253. See id. at 278.
254. See id. at 283.
255. Id at 283-84.
256. See supra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
257. See Landsman et al., supra note 7, at 317 tbl.3; supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
258. The study showed no statistically significant differences in the amount ofeompensatory damages
resulting from unitary versus bifurcated trials, in part because of the presence of several extremely high
awards. See id. at 318. Re-analysis to suppress the effect of the outlier high awards yielded only one
significant trend: jurors in unitary moderate-strength cases awarded substantially higher compensatory
damages when exposed to punitive-damages evidence. See id at 321. The effect did not appear when the
plaintiff's case was weak. See id.
259. See id. at 322.
260. The actual average punitive-damage awards were $1,080,400 in unitary trials versus $4,042,890
in bifurcated trials. See id. at 325. Even after compressing the few outlying high awards, the averages
were $544,555 in unitary trials versus $1,112,831 in bifurcated trials. See id.
261. The average defendant loss before the non-deliberatingjurors was $641,487 in bifurcated trials
versus $569,677 in unitary trials. See idat 329. The average defendant loss before the deliberating juries
was $1,676,563 in bifurcated trials versus $450,293 in unitary trials. See id at 330.
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B. The Role of the Jury
Another common argument against bifurcation is that it alters the role of
the jury.262 Indeed, how one views the proper role of the civil jury is perhaps
the single most accurate predictor of how one views bifurcation: those who
view the civil jury as a fact-finding body bound to follow the law usually
support bifurcation, while those who view the civil jury as serving a broader
social purpose that allows the jury to depart from the strict letter of the law
usually oppose bifurcation. 63 To advance the analysis beyond this
longstanding conceptual rift, this Article examines the impact of bifurcation
on the specific functions performed by the civil jury. Most people view civil
juries as serving four primary functions: (1) resolving disputes, (2)
overriding arbitrary or unfair government conduct, (3) legitimizing case
outcomes, and (4) providing a forum for deliberative democracy. 4 This
Article concludes that bifurcation does not significantly frustrate any of
these functions and in some cases may further them.265 Accordingly, the real
or perceived impact of bifurcation on the role of the jury cannot justify the
presumption against bifurcation.
262. See Trangsrud, supra note 29, at 81 ("[B]ifurcation is rare in ordinary tort litigation because for
decades most courts have felt that the fusion of liability and damage issues by a tort jury is necessary to
allow the jury to play its proper and traditional role as an institution that directly reflects current norms,
concerns, and thinking."). Some critics view these changes as diminishing the power of the jury. See
Smith, supra note 29, at 654 ("The current law interpreting Rule 42(b) fails to recognize the loss ofjury
power as a result of issue polyfurcation.").
263. Compare Mayers, supra note 9, at 394-95 (arguing that juries should follow law), with
Weinstein, supra note 29, at 832-34 (arguing that true value of civil jury stems from its ability and
willingness to depart from letter of law as guided by jury's collective sense of fairess).
264. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1423. This Article largely adopts that article's analytical
framework in the hope that doing so will simplify the discussion and provide a ready source for
background reading, without straying too far from the core procedural issues of this Article. For an
argument that the traditional framework adopted in this Article is incomplete in its failure to elucidate
how the civil jury creates opportunities for historically marginalized groups, see Phoebe A. Haddon,
Rethinking the Jury, 3 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 29, 53-62 (1994).
265. Civil juries also have a regulatory function in that their decisions send signals to future litigants
about expected outcomes. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1427 (citing Marc Galanter, The Regulatory
Function of the Civil Jury, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System 61-63 (Robert E. Litan ed.,
1993)). This Article assumes that unitary trials and bifurcated trials will be equally proficient (or equally
deficient) at sending accurate signals.
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1. The Jury as Decision Maker
The primary purpose of civil juries is to decide cases. First, the jury must
determine the relevant facts.2" Second, the jury must apply the law to those
facts when the facts and law combined do not compel judgment for either
party.267 While many jury critics argue that juries perform these tasks poorly
and expensively,26 this Article's purpose is not to praise or condemn civil
juries in an absolute sense. The only relevant question is a relative one-
whether bifurcation makes juries better or worse at deciding cases,
regardless of how well or poorly they performed the task generally.
To date, the story model provides the most satisfying model of how
juries decide cases.269 According to the story model, jurors organize and
digest information by a process of continually constructing, updating, and
revising plausible stories explaining the events. 7 The foundation for the
story is the actual evidence presented at trial.27 Jurors then draw from two
extra-legal sources to supplement the trial evidence: (1) their own ideas and
experience about similar events, and (2) their own "generic expectations
about what makes a complete story."2' In other words, jurors use their own
experiences or expectations as models, fitting the evidence presented into
the most analogous model and then filling in the gaps with inferences from
their own lives.273 The story that emerges is the one that best accounts for
266. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (finding jury trial unnecessary
where "there is no further factfinding function for the juy to perform"); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 157 (1973) ("ITihe purpose of the jury trial in ... civil cases [is] to assure a fair and equitable
resolution of factual issues.").
267. Stated otherwise, the function of thejuy ends when the undisputed facts compel judgment as a
matter of law. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (regarding summary judgment); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (regarding
judgment as a matter of law).
268. The classic condemnation of the civil jury remains Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial 108-25
(1949).
269. See Richard Lempert, Telling Tales In Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13 Cardozo
L. Rev. 559,560 (199 1) (asserting that story model "provides us with the most adequate portrait we have
to date of how individual jurors assemble evidence in a form that allows them to determine legal
consequences").
270. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 49, at 520-521.
271. Seeid at522.
272. Id. Ironically, the evidentiary rules that ban speculation by witnesses probably are the cause of
speculation by jurors, since the jurors will default to their own experiences and expectations in the
absence of specific evidence on the subject. See id at 523.
273. See id. at 522-23. The process ofmodeling and gap-filling can be quite ordinary. Pennington and
Hastie used the example of someone saying he went to a birthday party where the guests all sang "Happy
Birthday" and then Johnny "blew out the candles." Most people would conclude that there was a cake at
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the evidence presented ("coverage") and is most consistent, plausible, and
complete ("coherence"). 274 At the end of the trial, jurors then compare the
story they have constructed with the verdict categories and choose the
verdict that is the best fit, a process referred to as verdict matching. 75
Assuming civil jurors decide cases along the lines of the story model,276 a
strong argument for the presumption against bifurcation would exist if
bifurcation interferes with either story construction or verdict matching. On
the surface, the dangers are obvious. If juries resolve disputes by
constructing stories for cases, then splitting a trial into separate parts might
result in the jury being unable to form a story for that case as a whole. If
jurors cannot construct stories to decide cases, they might resort to
prejudices or stereotypes as a substitute. 77 On the other hand, one must also
consider the possible ways that bifurcation might improve story
construction. If, overall, bifurcation is either a neutral or positive influence
on story construction and jury decision making, then the presumption
against bifurcation must find its support elsewhere.
the party, because their own models for birthday parties usually include cake and because the reference
to candles implies they were on a cake. See id. at 523 n.11.
274. See id. at 527-28.
275. See id. at 530-31. Collectively, Pennington and Hastie characterize the overall story process as
having three components: "(1) evidence evaluation through story construction, (2) representation of the
decision alternatives by learning verdict category attributes, and (3) reaching a decision through the
classification of the story into the best fitting verdict category." Id. at 521. Story construction begins at
the earliest stage of the trial and continues through deliberations, as the jurors struggle at all points to
identify facts, sort through models, and fill in gaps. See id. at 53 1. While the juror may re-evaluate and
adjust the story as new evidence is presented, it is equally likely that the juror will simply ignore
evidence that is not consistent with his or her story, focus on the evidence that is consistent, and fill in
the rest. In one interview study, for example, Pennington and Hastie found that only 55% of the actions,
mental states, and goals that formed the jurors' stories were actually included in the testimony. See id. at
536. In other words, almost half of their stories consisted of inference.
276. Pennington and Hastie developed the story model to explain decision making by criminal juries.
See id. at 551. The early returns indicate that civil juries also employ a story model decision-making
paradigm. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of
Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 Judicature 22,27 (1989); Reid Hastie, The Role of"Stories "'
In Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 227, 234 (1999). Thus, while still not thoroughly
tested in the civil context, the story model is the clear front runner as the best paradigm for explaining
civil-jury behavior as well. See Lempert, supra note 269, at 560 & n.8.
277. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 276, at 27.
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a. How Bifurcation Might Assist Jury Decision Making
Many scholars have endorsed bifurcation in complex cases as a method
of improving juror comprehension."' Specifically, bifurcation might
enhance jury decision making in two ways: (1) by presenting the evidence
in a manner that is easier for the jurors to understand, and (2) by limiting
the number of legal issues the jury must address at any particular time.
These benefits should help jurors perform the story-construction and
verdict-matching tasks described by the story model of jury decision
making.
Bifurcation should enhance jurors' story construction by ordering and
simplifying the litigants' presentations. In a unitary trial, the jury hears all
of the evidence regarding all of the issues before deciding any of them.279
Witnesses in a unitary trial typically present all of their testimony during
one examination, even though that testimony may relate to different issues
such as liability and damages."O As a result, the presentation of evidence in
a unitary trial jumps between issues as the various witnesses are called to
testify. When the jury retires to deliberate, it must recall, sort through, and
analyze evidence relating to multiple issues that it heard scattered over the
course of several days, if not weeks.
In comparison, a bifurcated trial offers several advantages that should aid
jury comprehension. First, it substantially reduces the amount of evidence
the jury must absorb, integrate, or recall at any one time.28' Second, because
278. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension ofDifficult Issues: Lessonsfrom CivilJury
Trials, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 727, 767 (1991) (separating issues for trial promotes logical presentation of
evidence and reduces bias and confusion injury decision making); CivilJury, supra note 48, at 1498;
William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. Chi. Legal F. 119, 143-44 (stating that
bifurcation "permits the jury to concentrate on one major issue at a time therefore improving jury
comprehension"); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthfid, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 95, 156-58
(1996) (listing comprehension benefits of bifurcation); Maloney, Comment, supra note 77, at 100-01;
see also Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, § 3.06, at 110-11 (discussing issue separation to
promote jury comprehension in complex cases). But see Landsman et al., supra note 7, at 333-34
(finding no or modest gains in comprehension from bifurcation).
279. See supra note 9; see also William M. Landes, Sequential Trials Versus Unitary Trials: An
Economic Analysis, 22 J. Leg. Stud. 99, 100(1993) (describing unitary trial as trial "in which all of the
issues are presented before deciding the case"); Strier, supra note 278, at 140 ("All the evidence on all
the potential issues-no matter how lengthy, complicated, technical or scientific-is heard in one
nonsegmented continuous trial.").
280. See Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques 75 (4th ed. 1996) (describing typical direct examination
ofpersonal injury plaintiffas covering events of injury, medical treatment required, and present medical
problems and physical limitations).
281. For example, the plaintiffs in In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), objected
to the court's plan to try first the issue of whether Bendectin caused birth defects, arguing that the
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the jury decides the phases of a bifurcated trial separately, each segment is
substantially shorter than the whole trial would have been, therefore
keeping the evidence on the separated issues fresher in the minds of the
jurors when they deliberate. Third, by limiting the scope of each witness's
testimony, the parties are more likely to present their evidence in the order
that the events unfolded. 82 While the benefits from these differences are
most pronounced in lengthy or complex trials, in principle they should also
be available in ordinary trials, albeit to a lesser degree.283
Bifurcation should also aid jurors at the verdict-matching stage. Reid
Hastie's most recent study of civil-jury deliberation paints a disturbing
picture of the quality and accuracy of verdict matching. 28" Consistent with
causation issue was the one the jury was least capable of understanding. 857 F.2d at 315. The Sixth
Circuit disagreed:
[W]e conclude that if the issues were indeed difficult, their resolution was not rendered more
difficult due to trifurcation. If anything, the narrowing of the range of inquiry through trifurcation
substantially improved the manageability of the presentation of proofs by both sides and enhanced
the jury's ability to comprehend the causation issue.
Id. Interestingly, the court offered to try causation to a "blue ribbon jury" that would have had no trouble
understanding the technical causation evidence, but the plaintiffs rejected that idea. Id.
282. See Strier, supra note 278, at 140 (finding unitary trials result in "hodgepodge" that "confounds
the logical ordering ofevidence necessary to a systematic consideration of findings on specific issues").
Pennington and Hastie's story model suggests that the order of the evidence plays a significant role in
story construction. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 49, at 542. In their study, for example, the
conviction rate by mock jurors was 78% when the prosecution presented its case in story order and the
defense used the traditional witness order, but dropped to 31% when the prosecution and defense
swapped tactics. See id. at 542-43.
283. One recent study challenges the claim that bifurcation improves juror comprehension. The
Landsman mock asbestos trial study quizzed its mock jurors and found no difference in recall of
testimony between the unitary-trial jurors and the bifurcated trial jurors. Landsman et al., supra note 7, at
330 & tbl.9. The authors interpreted the results as "suggest[ing] that bifurcation does not enhance
memory of compensatory case facts." Id. at 333. While that study itself yielded no evidence that
bifurcation improves jury comprehension, neither does it prove that bifurcation will never improvejury
comprehension. The "mock trial in the Landsman study was not long enough to meaningfully contrast
jury comprehension between the unitary and bifurcated trial formats. The mock jurors in the Landsman
study heard only two hours and forty-five minutes oftaped testimony and deliberated the same day. See
id. at 315. Thus, the difference between hearing the entire trial and hearing only the compensatory
component was very small--perhaps an hour or so. A more realistic setting might involve a five-day trial
with three days of testimony on liability and two days of testimony on damages. In that scenario, the
jurors in the unitary-trial setting would have to recall five days worth of testimony. By comparison, the
jurors in the bifurcated-trial setting would have to recall, at most, only three days worth of testimony at
any given time. While hearing an extra hour ofdamages testimony did not appear to significantly impair
the jurors' ability to recall the two hours of liability evidence that preceded it, hearing an extra two days
of damages testimony might well impair the ability of jurors to recall three days' worth of liability
evidence.
284. Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liabilityfor
Punitive Damages, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 287 (1998).
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earlier studies, the study found that jurors often did not understand or apply
the judge's instructions on the law.285 Part of the problem, according to
Hastie, is that the underlying legal standards deviate from lay concepts of
liability and that the process of analyzing issues by conscientiously and
methodically considering specific elements is foreign to most jurors.286
Thus, "the jurors fall back on their rough-and-ready reasoning habits,
probably influenced by their sympathies for one party or the other, and they
fail to complete the task presented to them in their instructions from the
judge." 287
If jurors are overwhelmed by the verdict-matching process due to its
complexity and unfamiliarity, then any measures that simplify the task or
isolate the steps involved should help. Hastie, for example, suggests using
special interrogatories or special verdicts as a way of forcing jurors to
consider each legal element.288 Those measures certainly would force the
jury to do its job properly,289 but would not necessarily make the job any
easier: in a unitary trial, the jury would still face the daunting task of
understanding and applying all of the legal standards at the same time.
However, a bifurcated trial will improve the jury's ability to conceptualize
the case under the legal standards because the jury will be able to focus on
the legal standards separately.
b. Bifurcation as a Barrier to Jury Decision Making
Bordens and Horowitz were the first to suggest that bifurcation might
impair jury decision making by interfering with story construction.290 In
their mock-trial study, Bordens and Horowitz researched the separation of
285. See id at 304; see also Hannaford et al., supra note 51, at 256 ("Juries routinely struggle with
jury instructions on the applicable law, often misunderstanding legal concepts that are critical to the
correct application of the governing law to the facts.").
286. Hastie et al., supra note 284, at 307.
287. R at308.
288. See ia
289. Isolating issues also forces the litigants to meet the informational needs ofthejury by making it
harder to gloss over issues or engage in diversionary tactics. All too often, jury trials devolve into a
battle of themes that rewards litigants who simply repeat catchy phrases and penalizes litigants who
attempt a detailed and methodical presentation of the facts. Many juries may end up guessing about
complex issues in unitary trials because the lawyers figured it was better to "dumb down" their case than
to hit the merits hard and risk the jury losing sight of their overall themes. Focusing on a single issue
might reduce the "merits penalty" by allowing litigants to make detailed presentations on complicated
issues with less worry that they will overwhelm the rest of their cases.
290. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 276, at 27.
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general causation, liability, and damages in a complex toxic-tort setting.29'
They found evidence that, while the unitary-trial juries were generally using
the story model to decide issues, the trifurcated-trial juries were instead
using "other, perhaps less sophisticated, heuristics," such as "corporate-
capitalist versus the little guy" or "good guy versus bad guy." 29 2 At first
blush, these results seem a damning indictment of bifurcation: few would
support a procedure that replaces evidence-based decision making with
adjudication by stereotype. Upon closer examination, however, the results
of that study do not support the conclusion that increased bifurcation will
replace good jury decision making with bad jury decision making. Indeed,
Bordens and Horowitz's observations possibly illustrate a problem inherent
in jury decision making that neither a bifurcated nor unitary trial structure
can correct.
On the whole, the evidence does not support the conclusion that issue
separation leads to unsophisticated decision-making heuristics. The
phenomenon that Bordens and Horowitz observed occurred in a study of
multiple-issue separation in complex cases." The fact thatjuries struggle to
construct stories to explain general causation in a toxic-tort trial does not
mean that juries will struggle to construct separate narratives in other
contexts, such as the separation of liability and damages. The story model
indicates that juries build their stories by first constructing smaller stories,
known as sub-stories or episodes. 294 Each episode might consist of smaller
component episodes. 95 To the extent jurors naturally analyze cases by
breaking them down and constructing sub-stories, bifurcation seems
consonant with story-model decision making in most ordinary litigation.296
291. See id. at 24.
292. Id.
293. See id.
294. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 49, at 526.
295. See id.
296. In an ordinary car-accident case, for example, it seems likely that jurors inherently construct
separate episodes to address what caused the accident (liability) and how badly the parties were hurt
(damages). Similarly, in a typical employment-discrimination case, it would seem natural that jurors
would construct separate stories to address why someone was fired and the damages they suffered as a
result. Many of the less common forms of issue separation also seem in harmony with the construction
of sub-stories. In a contract case, for example, nothing in the story model suggests that juries would be
unable to distinguish the issue of whether a contract existed from the issue of whether that contract was
breached. Nor does the story model suggest any reason why a jury could not determine whether a
plaintiff stood in the right capacity to bring a suit separately from the merits of the suit. An example of
this is where a company defends a personal-injury claim by asserting that the plaintiff was a statutory
employee limited to the remedies available under workers' compensation. See Dixon v. Certainteed
Corp., 166 F.R.D. 487, 488-89 (D. Kan. 1996) (bifurcating issue of statutory employee status).
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A more challenging question is whether juries can construct meaningful
sub-stories to address discrete and technical issues like causation.297
Bordens and Horowitz's observations and conclusions are helpful here. The
first thing they observed was that juries tended to deviate from story-model
decision making when general causation was tried separately.29 The simple
mechanics of the story model can fully explain this result. Story
construction is a convergence of the evidence presented and the juror's own
life experiences, with those life experiences providing both a model for
what the story should consist of and content where the trial evidence leaves
gaps.2 Most jurors' life experiences will be informative when the issue to
be decided involves everyday life events such as what caused a traffic
accident or why someone was fired. However, some issues will be so far
removed from the experiences of everyday people that jurors have no
models upon which to construct a story, or have no information to fill in the
gaps.3" For instance, the experiences of most citizens would probably
supply an inadequate framework for a story that focused exclusively on
causal relationships in toxic-tort cases. So perhaps the fact that Horowitz
and Bordens' jurors abandonded story-model decision making when asked
to decide causation separately should come as no surprise.
Nevertheless, the unitary-trial setting is not necessarily preferable. If the
jurors truly lack the models or gap fillers needed to construct a story
explaining a particular issue or element, and the pertinent evidence does not
bridge that gap, expanding the scope of the trial will not cure the deficiency.
Rather, a unitary trial only covers up the deficiency by putting the jurors in
a position where they can either: (1) ignore the issue, or (2) use evidence
from other parts of the trial to resolve that issue, regardless of the relevance
of that evidence. In the Bordens and Horowitz study, the authors
specifically noted that the unitary trial juries (which rendered a higher
297. In the Bendectin litigation, for example, the trial judge trifurcated the case and had the jury first
determine the sole issue of whether Bendectin caused birth defects at all. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857
F.2d 290,298 (6th Cir. 1988). For a more detailed description of this case, see infra notes 357-362 and
accompanying text.
298. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 276, at 27.
299. See supra notes 269-75 and accompanying text.
300. Some scientific evidence may be so inherently complex that no jury could ever follow it. An
improbable (but entertaining and illustrative) example might be to imagine ajury in the 1930s trying to
follow a quantum-physics issue pitting Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg as rival experts. See Michael
Frayn, Copenhagen (1998) (illustrating the elusiveness of complex and abstract principles even when
presented in their most simplified form). In most situations the litigants probably can present complex
issues in an understandable form if those issues are separated from the rest of the case so the jury could
focus on those issue alone.
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number of plaintiff verdicts) waited to hear the damages evidence before
making up their minds and then "utilize[d] all the trial evidence while
deciding each individual trial issue."' '
In the end, when jurors are unable to make meaningful judgments about
causation, they appear to misbehave in both the unitary and bifurcated trial
settings. In the unitary trial setting, the jurors appear to have used the
damages evidence as a substitute for causation; in the bifurcated trials, the
jurors based causation on the stereotypes of the bad company versus the
innocent individual. 30 2 Thus, neither setting yielded a legally principled
result. While this phenomenon may be a reason to reject trying technical
issues to juries in the first place,0 3 it does not support favoring a unitary
trial over a bifurcated trial.3 4
In summary, the story model of juror decision making does not justify
the presumption against bifurcation. First, in most cases, bifurcation will not
interfere with story modeling at all because it aligns with the jurors' normal
construction of sub-stories. If bifurcation does result in the jury being
presented with an issue it cannot model, that is a sign that the jury might not
understand the issue well enough to render a principled decision, regardless
of the structure of the trial. Second, a unitary trial may actually deprive
juries of the many comprehension benefits that come with hearing issues
separately. Thus, the presumption against bifurcation may impair both juror
story construction specifically and jury comprehension generally by forcing
301. Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 276, at 27.
302. See id.
303. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069,1084 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding jury
trial violated Due Process Clause where merits were beyond jury's comprehension). One commentator
has proposed to solve this problem by selecting only well-educated jurors for complex cases. See
Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposalfor Complex Litigation, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 49, 62-63
(1997) (arguing that educated jury allows meaningful decision making while preserving right to jury
trial).
304. The Bendectin litigation also illustrates this phenomenon. Commenting on the use of the story
model, one article asserted that "[w]hen a defendant's fault (or a plaintiff's damages) assists in
understanding causal uncertainties, [the jury] may be able to formulate a more coherent story than when
causation is tried first, in isolation from the rest of the case." Wendy A. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in
the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 773, 829 n.202 (1997). The article does not
elaborate on how evidence of the defendant's fault or the plaintiff's damages sheds any light on
causation, nor could it, other than to support an assumption by the jurors that there must be causation
whenever poor testing procedures and severe injuries are present. For a more thorough discussion of how
the plaintiffs in the Bendectin cases successfully commingled negligence and damages evidence with the
issue of causation, see Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 53-54 (1993).
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juries to hear evidence "out of order" and then grapple with all of the legal
issues simultaneously.
2. The Jury as a Check on Government Conduct
During colonial times, the jury was viewed as an important mechanism
for constraining the power of the government. 5 The Anti-Federalists
argued, for example, that civil juries were necessary to counteract corrupt
judges." 6 They also argued that civil juries would be needed for suits
against the government, because judges, being a part of the government,
would be expected to side with the government.307 Finally, many viewed the
common sense of the civil juror as the final safeguard against unwise or
unfair legislation.0 8
None of these values support the presumption against bifurcation today.
Some of these concerns no longer apply. Few would argue today, for
example, that the federal judiciary is so corrupt (if at all) that citizens need
to participate in every case as a prophylactic measure. While civil juries
may still be a counterweight to pro-government judges in cases where the
government is a party, that rationale cannot support the existing
presumption that applies in all cases.
If the civil jury still serves a general regulatory function against the
government, that function is to nullify unjust laws by refusing to follow
them in civil cases. Critics often argue that bifurcation limits the ability of
the jury to "temper" their verdicts-to replace a harsh legal doctrine with a
less severe one.3' Despite the romantic appeal of nullification, it is not a
valid basis to oppose bifurcation.
305. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L.
Rev. 639,708 (1973). Other ratification-era arguments forciviljuries included the protection ofdebtors
from creditor-friendly federal courts. See id at 673.
306. See id. at 708. On this point alone, Alexander Hamilton agreed with the Anti-Federalists. See id.
at 709-10 (arguing are juries harder to corrupt because there are 12 and sit for only one case at a time).
307. See id at 708.
308. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1430 ("[TIhe jury frustrates the application of unjust laws
enacted by misguided legislatures."). Indeed, the Anti-Federalists favored the less efficient jury trial over
the quicker and cheaper judge trial "precisely because in important instances, through its ability to
disregard substantive rules of law, the jury would reach a result that the judge either could not or would
not reach." Wolfram, supra note 305, at 671.
309. See Weinstein, supra note 29, at 833-34; see also Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130,
§ 3.06, at 120-21 (discussing "lively debate among commentators and judges over what is the 'proper'
jury function").
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First, nullification of any kind is anti-democratic. It is one thing for ajury
to ignore the king's law. There, it can be said that the jury is acting as the
voice of the people. But when the law is made by democratically elected
officials (or the judges those officials appoint), the people have already
spoken. A jury's refusal to enforce the law is just as likely the product of
ignorance or bias as the result of those twelve (or six) citizens having a
better sense of the public's will than the public's democratically elected
representatives."' At the very least, nullification's questionable political
legitimacy makes it a slender reed upon which to hang a system-wide
procedural presumption against bifurcation.
Second, even if nullification or tempering were consistent with
representative government, that battle has already been fought and lost. The
U.S. Supreme Court first outlawed jury nullification in the federal courts
more than 100 years ago3 H and shows no interest in revisiting the issue."'
Recently the Court has expressly stated that civil juries "mustfollow the law
and act as impartial factfinders. 31 3 The federal courts similarly reject
compromise verdicts because they represent a form of liability not
authorized under the law.314 Indeed, modem federal civil practice includes
numerous procedural devices, strategically positioned along the litigation
path, that ensure that decisions faithfully follow the law.315 If anything, the
310. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1431.
311. See generally Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Jury nullification is "unlawftul" in the
sense that juries are not supposed to do it and are no longer instructed that they are thejudge of the facts
andlav. Ofcourse, since juries deliberate in secrecy, it is virtually impossible to detect nullification. See
Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 20 1,
209 (1998).
312. The U.S. Supreme Court officially declared the nullification debate over more than 50 years ago:
If the intention is to claim generally that the [Seventh] Amendment deprives the federal courts of
power to direct a verdict for insufficiency of evidence, the short answer is the contention has been
foreclosed by repeated decisions made consistently for nearly a century. More recently, the practice
has been approved explicitly in the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
objection therefore comes too late.
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 (1943) (footnote and citations omitted).
313. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,630 (1990) (holding that civil litigants may
not exercise preemptory challenges based on race) (emphasis added).
314. See Nichols v. Cadle Co., 139 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting federal courts view com-
promise verdicts with "a settled hostility.") A compromise verdict occurs when the jury cannot agree on
liability, so instead compromises by finding for the plaintiff but awarding less in damages than the
plaintiffotherwise would deserve. See Carter v. Chicago Police Officers, 165 F.3d 1071, 1082 (7th Cir.
1998); Shugart v. Central Rural Elec. Coop., 110 F.3d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir. 1997).
315. These devices include motions to dismiss, motions for summaryjudgment, motions forjudgment
as a matter of law (both before and after the defense is presented), special verdicts and interrogatories,
and motions for new trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 56, 50, 49, 59.
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federal system has evolved to the point where decisions contrary to the law
may actually violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 6
Thus, any argument for unitary trials predicated on jury "lawlessness' 317
finds no support in today's federal court system.
Finally, even if in the federal system juries should have a case-by-case
legislative veto, juries would not need to hear the entire case in order to
exercise that function.318  Bifurcation critics credit tempering with
stimulaiting the development of comparative-negligence law.319 One might
ask, though, why ajury would need to hear damages evidence to know that
a strict rule of contributory negligence was too harsh for the automobile
age. For example, assume plaintiffs are driving through an intersection and
have a green light, but are traveling five miles over the speed limit. The
plaintiffs see another vehicle negligently pull out in front of them from the
cross-street but cannot slow down in time to avoid the hazard. Under a strict
contributory-negligence scheme, the plaintiffs' speeding might have
constituted contributory negligence and precluded all recovery.320 By
contemporary standards, that result would seem unfair. But is it any more or
less unfair depending on whether the plaintiffs' injuries are minor or
severe? A jury hearing only the liability issue of that lawsuit could still
render a counter-factual decision that nullified strict contributory
negligence, thereby allowing the plaintiff to recover something. Of course,
not having heard the damages evidence, the jury might not feel any desire to
316. See Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. Chi.
Legal F. 33, 46. The advisory committee's note to the 1991 amendments to Rule 50 is instructive: "The
revision of this subdivision aims to facilitate the exercise by the court of its responsibility to assure the
fidelity of its judgment to the controlling law, a responsibility imposed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment" Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee's note (citing Galloway, 319 U.S. 372).
317. Wolfram, supra note 305, at 705.
318. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 1213 ("[Ilt is not necessary thatjudge orjury be apprised of all
the facts in the entire litigation in order to reach a decision which 'tempers' substantive law.").
319. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 180 ,at 80-84 (attributing comparative negligence and workers'
compensation statutes to influence of civil jury); Weinstein, supra note 29, at 833-34; Stephen C.
Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. Chi. Legal F. 87, 113 (crediting jury
tempering with rewriting law of negligence). Looking back, though, it is perhaps presumptuous to say
that these reforms would not have occurred but for the fact of the civil jury. By the early 1900s,
contributory negligence was already being criticized by academics and abolished by legislatures. See
Stephan Landsman, The Civil Juy in America: Scenesfrom an Unappreciated History, 44 Hastings L.
579,609 (1993). Onewill neverknow whetherthe civiljury advancedjustice by implementing de facto
reform while legislatures spun their wheels, or whether it hurt the cause by removing the urgency and
therefore delaying actual reform. See Mayers, supra note 9, at 394-95 (arguing that jury tempering
masks effects of unfair law and therefore suppresses grass-roots legal reform).
320. SeeRestatement (Second) ofTorts § 467(1965) (explaining plaintiff's contributory negli-gence
bars recovery against defendant whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable to plaintiff).
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do so. But if a rule of law is so unfair that juries should nullify it, the
unfairness should transcend the severity of the injury. Otherwise, the jury is
not updating the law, but is really just applying ad hoc standards of
recovery based on sympathy.
Once again, the Bendectin litigation is illustrative.32' The plaintiffs were
never able to muster much evidence that Bendectin caused birth defects at
all.322 On the other hand, there was strong evidence that Merrell Dow had
done a poor job of testing Bendectin.323 While not all of the juries found
liability, those that did may have done so not because they found causation
but to punish Merrell Dow for its testing inadequacies.324 Would those juries
have been willing to impose liability against Merrell Dow based on its
reportedly shoddy testing if the injuries at issue were minor or temporary in
nature, rather than severe, long-term physical deformities? If the juries'
basis for nullifying causation was a belief that the law should punish drug
manufacturers for poor testing, the only evidence they needed was the
evidence relating to Merrell Dow's testing and not the evidence relating to
the plaintiffs' injuries. Thus, if juries truly want to relieve plaintiffs of
proving causation in drug cases generally, they are just as free to do so in
trifurcated trials as they are in unitary trials. The absence of damages
evidence may eliminate one incentive for nullifying the causation
requirement (sympathy or anger),3 25 but it does not limit the correct
incentive for doing so (the belief that requiring the plaintiff to bear the often
impossible burden of proving causation in pharmaceutical cases is unfair) or
the jury's ability to do it.326
321. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988). For a history and criticism of the
numerous cases filed against Merrell Dow alleging Bendectin caused birth defects, see Michael D.
Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of Mass Toxic Substances Litigation (1996).
322. See Sanders, supra note 304, at 25 ("[T]he evidence has persuaded most of the scientific
community that Bendectin is not a teratogen."); id. at 53 (noting causation was "the weakest part of the
plaintiff's case").
323. See id. at 53-54.
324. See Wagner, supra note 304, at 828-29.
325. See Richard L. Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 231, 248
(1997) (reviewing Green, supra note 32 1, and noting that plaintiffs in Bendectin litigation should have
lost and that polyfurcation appeared to enhance accuracy of the jury's verdict by preventing prejudice
from sympathy).
326. Professor Trangsrud, for example, criticized the trifurcation of the Bendectin case because of the
possibility that "juries presented with the entire case against the manufacturer... would have awarded
discounted damages to the plaintiffs before them, mindful of the serious character of the plaintiffs'
injuries and the inconclusive evidence that the injuries were caused by the defendant's drug." Trangsrud,
supra note 29, at 82 (emphasis added), He concluded that the judge's trifurcation order prevented the
jury from anticipating legal reform that would "allow a discounted recovery when a defendant's product
Vol. 75:705, 2000
Bifurcation
In summary, bifurcation is not at odds with the civil jury's role as a
government watchdog. In large part, that job has eroded over time: society
no longer needs juries to sniff out corrupt or biased judges, and no longer
wants or allows juries to substitute their views of what the law should be.
To the extentthat society secretly wants juries to disregard existing law as
outdated or unfair, bifurcation is no obstacle. Indeed, bifurcation may
provide the best litmus test available. If society is going to delegate to a
handful of randomly selected citizens the job of determining when a legal
rule is so unfair that it should be disregarded, those citizens should exercise
that power only when they deem the legal rule to be overtly, obviously, and
unambiguously unfair standing alone, without regard to the extent of a
plaintiff's injuries or the conduct of the litigants.
3. The Jury as a Legitimizer of Verdicts
Civil juries can also promote public acceptance of verdicts in the judicial
system. Civil juries are often called upon to resolve questions that defy
logic or legislative predetermination.327 The civil jury, for example,
shoulders the burden of assigning dollar values to inherently incalculable
losses such as pain and suffering328 or loss of consortium.329 Juries are often
in a better position to make these difficult decisions than judges. The public
may be more willing to accept a controversial verdict from a group of its
peers than a single judge.330 At the very least, the jury, being temporary and
diffuse, will make less of a target than the judge.33' Thus, the jury insulates
increases the risk of disease or injury beyond natural levels, but strict causation cannot be proven due to
the passage of time or the imperfect nature of our science.'Id. Note that the anticipated reform does not
include using the severity of the plaintiff's injuries as a determinant for whether to relax the causation
requirement. Thus, a verdict rendered by a jury "mindful of the serious character of the plaintiff's
injuries" falls outside the scope of both current causation law and the anticipated reform standard.
327. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1434-35.
328. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 cmt. b (1979) (explaining because there is no "market
price" for pain and suffering, jury must determine amount of damages that "a reasonable person would
estimate as fair compensation").
329. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) § 32.04 (3d ed. 1994) (measuring damages for loss
of consortium by "[t]he reasonable value of the society, companionship and sexual relationship" of a
spouse that other spouse has lost so far and is reasonably certain to be deprived of in future).
330. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1433.
331. See id at 1433-34; see also Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the CivilJury. Can Reality
Be Found in the Illusions?, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 221,239-40 (1998). Professor Saks suggests that the
public's displeasure with juries may be proof thatjuries in fact do protectjudges by acting as "lightning
rods." Id at 240. Studies consistently show that judges agree with most jury verdicts. See Hannaford et
al., supra note 51, at 249. Assuming this to be true, it should be no surprise thatjudges are comparatively
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the judicial system from criticism, both by serving as a "lightning rod" for
criticism of unpopular verdicts 3 2 and by protecting the judiciary from
allegations of elitism, judicial bias, or political influence.333 Finally, many
tough decisions submitted to civil juries lie at gaps in the law, which
common sense and societal norms must fill.334 Whereas ajudge would have
to articulate both the existence of the gap and the content of the filler, ajury
verdict sweeps those items under the rug, revealing only the outcome.335
Thus, juries fill the role of answering questions through unstated societal
standards where express legal rules would be inadequate or even
destructive.336
Bifurcation does not undermine the jury's role as a legitimizer of
verdicts. As with unitary trials, the judge and judicial system are still
insulated from criticism. Juries can still apply unspoken societal norms
when legal rules fail. Even when trials are bifurcated, juries' verdicts will
still achieve greater public acceptance as the product of community values
rather than the political leanings of one person perched high in an ivory
tower. Because the juries' verdicts in bifurcated trials will serve the same
supportive of civil juries, since the civil jury can be counted on to take the fall in deciding difficult or
unpopular cases. See Saks, supra, at 240 & n.84.
332. See id. at 239; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1055,
1062 (1964); George L. Priest, The Role ofthe Civil Jury in a System ofPrivate Litigation, 1990 U. Chi.
Legal F. 161, 167.
333. See Hannaford et al., supra note 51, at 25 1. An increased reliance on judges, for example, would
make the judges' own political preferences more important and would give "wealthy repeat player
litigants [additional] reason to spend lavishly to influence the selection of even low level trial judges."
Richard Lempert, Why Do Juries Get A Bum Rap? Reflections on the Work of Valerie Hans, 48 DePaul
L. Rev. 453, 462 (1998).
334. See CivilJury, supra note 48, at 1434-34.
335. In actions tried to the court, thejudge must "set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of no action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In contrast, unless the court submits a
special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 49, the jury will issue a
general verdict that identifies only which party prevailed and the amount of damages awarded, if any.
See 3 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, § 22.70(1)(a). Because the jury does not identify its
reasoning in a general verdict, general verdicts commonly are referred to as "black box" decisions. See
Civil lury, supra note 48, at 1500 & n.70. "Courts and commentators agree that the majority of federal
jury-tried cases are submitted to the jury using a general charge." Elizabeth G. Thomburg, The Power
and the Process: Instructions and the Civil Jury, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1837, 1840 (1998).
336. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1435-36. Many of the most troublesome jury questions, such as
reasonableness, are said to be mixed questions of law and fact. It is more accurate to say that every
mixed determination yields a legal rule: does that particular rule of law apply or extend to a very specific
set of facts as determined by the jury? In this sense, juries who decide mixed-question cases make law,
but "they do it quietly; and their work does not leave many visible traces." Friedman, supra note 311, at
211.
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legitimating function as those arising out of unitary trials, the juries'
legitimating function cannot support the presumption against bifurcation.
4. The Jury as a Forum for Deliberative Democracy
Finally, the civil jury is a forum for ordinary citizens-people of the
"middling sort"-to participate in the everyday administration of
government. 37 Jury service has been praised as a forum to educate the
citizens about the law and the judicial system.3 In this regard, the civil jury
is a right not of the litigants, but of the jurors themselves. 3 39 Moreover, the
civil jury promotes democratic values by forcing legislatures, judges, and
attorneys to articulate the law in a clear and common-sense fashion,
comprehensible by the ordinary citizen.34
Bifurcation does not conflict with these values or purposes. First,
bifurcation as a procedure simply does not remove the people from the jury.
Thus, the lay citizenry retains its role in the administration of the
government. As discussed above, the separation of issues does not diminish
the jury's role; juries remain free to evaluate laws and cases through lenses
of common sense and equity to the same extent allowed by pre-existing
337. CivilJury, supra note 48, at 1437 (quoting Landsman et al, supra note 319, at 588-89). The U.S.
Supreme Court made this point expressly in the criminal context: "The opportunity for ordinary citizens
to participate in the administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the principal
justifications for retaining the jury system." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1990) (holding that
race.-based peremptory challenges violate Equal Protection Clause even when defendant and stricken
juror are of different races, in part because challenges impair rights of stricken juror to participate in
judicial system).
338. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 203, 221 (1995). Cumulatively, then, the citizens would "learn self-government by doing self-
government." Akhil L Amar, Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1187 (1991). Not
everyone subscribes to this view. George Priest, for example, studied jury service in Cook County,
Illinois, which includes Chicago, and concluded that the citizens of that county had only a 20% chance
of serving on a civil jury in their lifetime and that most of the cases they might sit on were ordinary cases
devoid of complex social values. Priest, supra note 332, at 187-91. Accordingly, while civil jury service
in the early 19th century may have served the educational purpose identified by Alexis de Tocqueville, it
may no longer serve that purpose today. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 275 (Phillip
Bradley trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835) (stating that jury service should "be regarded as a
gratuitous public school, ever open, in which every juror learns his rights and becomes practically
acquainted with the law").
339. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1437; cf Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
629 (1990) (discussing civil litigants' standing to raise juror's right not to be excluded from jury because
of race) Powers, 499 U.S. at 407 ("[W]ith the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and
privilege ofjury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.").
340. See Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1439 ("The civil jury is a welcome limit on the esotericism of
the law, a reminder that legal rules should ideally be comprehensible to the average citizen.").
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limitations.341 Second, jurors in bifurcated trials still learn about the law and
the judicial system. Any differences in education due to trials that end after
an early finding on some issue are differences in degree and not in nature.342
Finally, bifurcation does not conflict with the goal of bringing clarity to the
law. Whether or not trials are bifurcated will not cause judges or legislatures
to lapse into esotericism. If anything, bifurcation promotes clarity at the
back end by allowing jurors to decide cases in more focused and
manageable segments.343
5. Bifurcation and the Role of the Jury: A Summation
The bifurcation debate should not be framed as a debate about the merits
or the future of the civil jury system. This Article assumes that civil juries
are valuable and asks only whether bifurcation significantly undermines any
of the functions or benefits afforded by a unitary civil jury trial. This Article
concludes that bifurcation does not interfere with the role of the jury and,
indeed, often better promotes the values served by the jury than the unitary
trial. Unlike other reforms, which sacrifice one value of the civil jury to
promote another, increased bifurcation yields a "happy confluence of
different objectives." ''  Thus, the impact of bifurcation on the role of the
jury does not support the presumption against bifurcation in federal courts.
C. Prejudice, Sympathy, and the Sterile Trial Environment
Rule 42(b) allows federal judges to bifurcate issues to "avoid
prejudice. 3 45 The prejudice Rule 42(b) seeks to avoid is the risk that
341. See supra notes 318-26 and accompanying text.
342. In a case bifurcating liability and damages, for example, the jury would receive the same
education regarding substantive liability as the jury in a unitary trial. Although the jury in the bifurcated
trial might not be educated about damages law if the defendant prevails on liability, this cannot be a
basis to oppose bifurcation. If citizen education as a justification for civil juries extended beyond the
needs of the case, it would warrant education not just about unnecessary damages law, but all sorts of
other laws as well. Indeed, there would be no reason why the law to be taught had to relate to the merits
at all.
343. See supra notes 278-89 and accompanying text.
344. Civil Jury, supra note 48, at 1442. This may explain why many who acknowledge the faults of
the civil jury but wish to preserve it consider bifurcation to be a valuable contribution to jury reform. See
Carrington, supra note 316, at 66-67 ("[Plart of the answer to the problem ofjury competence lies in
more frequent use of the court's discretion under Rule 42 to sever issues for separate trial."); Schwarzer,
supra note 278, at 143-44.
345. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
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evidence pertaining to one issue will improperly influence the jury's
decision on another issue. In tort cases, for example, defendants often ask
the court to bifurcate liability and damages to avoid the risk of a sympathy
verdict.3" As one court explained, a unitary trial "may result in sympathetic
jurors more concerned with compensating the plaintiff for his injury than
whether or not the defendant is at fault."347 Sometimes, however, the
plaintiff seeks bifurcation to avoid prejudice. Plaintiffs may seek to
bifurcate liability and damages, for example, where the damages testimony
is likely to evoke antipathy rather than sympathy.348 When faced with a
bifurcation motion based on prejudice, the courts usually consider whether
the risk of prejudice can be ameliorated by limiting instructions.349
346. See, e.g., Helminski v. Ayerst Lab., Inc., 766 F.2d 208, 212 (6th Cir. 1985) (bifurcating liability
and damages to avoid prejudice to defendant in pharmaceutical products-liability case); Lagudi v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 775 F. Supp. 73,76 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (bifurcating liability and damages in personal-
injury case because it was "clear that evidence about plaintiff's alleged injuries may well serve to
confuse the jury as to the separate questions of liability and damages").
347. Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Miller v. New
Jersey Transit Auth. Rail Ops., 160 F.R1D. 37,41 (D.NJ. 1995) ("[S]ympatheticjurors might be inclined
to award Plaintiff some money, no matter how small, regardless of fault, if they were aware of the
magnitude of the injuries incurred and the damages sought."); Witherbee v. Honeywell, Inc., 151 F.R.D.
27,29 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that bifurcation of liability and damages was warranted because "courts
have found there is a potential that ajury may be adversely and improperly affected in considering the
issues of liability fairly, impartially, and objectively"). The prejudice from sympathy may be more than
just thejury feeling sorry for the plaintiff. Rather, sympathy forthe plaintiff may actually cause thejury
to dislike the defendant. In one study ofa hypothetical birth-defects lawsuit against a drug company, the
mock jurors developed increasingly negative feelings toward the defendant drug company depending on
the severity of the plaintiff' s injuries, even though the jurors all heard the same evidence regarding the
drug company's conduct See Bomstein, supra note 55, at 1485.
348. In Berry v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 1994), for example, a high school student sued her
truant officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for emotional distress arising from a coerced sexual relationship
and subsequent abortion. 28 F.3d at 605-06. When the defendant announced his intention to introduce
evidence ofprevious sexual activity and abortions to refute herclaim of emotional distress, the plaintiff
moved to bifurcate liability and damages for fear the jury would hold those activities against her in
determining liability. See id. at 609-10; see also, e.g., Kerman v. City of New York, No. 96-C-7865,
1997 WL 666261, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 24, 1997) (regarding plaintiffmoving to bifurcate liability and
damages in unlawful-detention action against police where evidence of his mental problems relevant to
damages would affect jury's determination of liability); Mann v. University of Cincinnati, 157 F.RD.
40, 41-42 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (denying student's motion to bifurcate liability and damages in lawsuit
alleging arbitrary grading where damages evidence would include her entire academic record showing
that she was "not a serious student"); Bieme v. Security Heating-Clearwater Pools, Inc., 759 F. Supp.
1120, 1124 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (granting plaintiff's motion to trifurcate issue ofcause offire from liability
and damages where defendant planned to introduce evidence that decedent was intoxicated at time of fire
to refute decedent's claims for pain and suffering).
349. See, e.g., Ake v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 877 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (deciding
danger of prejudice in products-liability case alleging defective fuel system caused car fire would be
addressed "through appropriate jury instructions'); Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1163,
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Logically, the risk of juries improperly using evidence cannot be the
basis for the presumption against bifurcation. In a bifurcated trial, the jury
cannot improperly use evidence pertaining to the separated issue because
the jury simply does not hear the evidence at that stage of the trial. In
contrast, the unitary trial creates opportunities for prejudice by presenting
multiple issues to the jury at the same time. Accordingly, the risk that juries
will use evidence in an improper way would support a presumption for
bifurcation, not against it.
One permutation of the prejudice argument, however, could logically
support a presumption against bifurcation. The sterile-trial theory asserts
that bifurcation causes prejudice by creating a sterile trial environment that
obscures the gravity of the underlying events and strips the trial of its
human element.350 This theory seems to have derived from a pair of Sixth
Circuit decisions during the 1980s. In the first case, In re Beverly Hills Fire
Litigation,35' the plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of aluminum electrical
wiring alleging that a defect in the wiring caused a supper-club fire that
killed 165 people.5 2 The trial court bifurcated the trial so that the jury
would first determine whether the aluminum wiring could have caused the
fire in the manner claimed by the plaintiffs.353 The jury found for the
defendants. 354 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but cautioned that the separate
trial of causation might "deprive plaintiffs of their right to place before the
jury the circumstances and atmosphere of the entire cause of action...
replacing it with a sterile or laboratory trial atmosphere." '355 The Sixth
Circuit discounted any such effect in that case, however, because the fire
1171 (N.D. Ga. 1990) ("The court is confident that with the aid ofcautionary instructions, ajury will be
able to fairly and impartially determine both liability and damages in a single trial."). These cautionary
instructions presumably would be in addition to the standard federal jury instruction against sympathy.
See Edward J. Devitt et al., 1 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 71.01 (1987) ("The law does not
permit you to be governed by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. All parties expect that you will...
follow the law as it is now being given to you, and reach a just verdict, regardless of the
consequences.").
350. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Managing Complex Litigation in the Illinois Courts, 27 Loy. U. Chi.
L.J. 959, 980 (1996) (arguing against issue separation in Illinois because of resultant sterile trial setting).
351. 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982).
352. Id. at 209.
353. See id. at 210. The plaintiffs' theory was that the fire was caused when a portion of the
defendants' aluminum wiring connected to an electrical outlet overheated. See id. The defendants
countered that the fire had been the result of one of the many other reported fire code violations at the
supper club. See id. at 211.
354. See id. at 211.
355. Id. at217.
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was "a major disaster in Kentucky history... generally known to the jurors
from the outset" and because the evidence presented was "fully adequate to
apprise the jury of the general circumstances of the tragedy and the
environment in which the fire arose.,
356
The Sixth Circuit revisited the sterile-trial theme six years later in In re
Bendectin Litigation 357 a consolidated products-liability case alleging that
Bendectin, a morning-sickness drug, caused birth defects.35 The trial judge
divided the case into three phases: (1) the threshold causation issue of
whether Bendectin caused birth defects, (2) the remaining liability issues,
and (3) damages.359 The jury found that the plaintiffs had not proved
causation and the court entered judgment for the defendants. 3' The Sixth
Circuit again acknowledged the risk of a sterile trial environment, but this
time characterized that concern as "the potential danger that the jury may
decide the causation question without appreciating the scope of the injury
that defendant has supposedly caused and without the realization that their
duties involve the resolution of an important, lively and human
controversy. '36  As in Beverly Hills, the Sixth Circuit decided that the court
and the litigants had taken adequate steps to ensure that the jury appreciated
the importance of its task and the interests at stake and affirmed.362
In one sense, the bifurcation critics appear to be on the right track.
According to the sterile-trial theory, bifurcation obscures the magnitude of
356. Id.
357. 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
358. Il at293.
359. See id at 298. The other liability issues included whether Bendectin was unreasonably
dangerous and whether Merrell Dow, the manufacturer of Bendectin, provided adequate warnings about
possible dangers. See id.
360. See id.
361. Id at316.
362. See id The court cited to the trial judge's instructions to the jury and the plaintiffs' attorney's
closing arguments. See id. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
Let me suggest to you that what you are about to do may be one of the most important things you
will ever do in your entire life. This is a significant case. It involves a lot of people. It involves not
only the plaintiffs who are individuals, it involves people, scientists, people who have done
experiments, people who are employees of the defendant company. The totality of this case involves
people and while you will heartechnical evidence, I do point out to you that at all times, you should
keep in mind that on both sides, there are people involved.
Id
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the case itself and the significance of the jury's decision.363 In other words,
juries that do not hear evidence regarding the plaintiff's injuries and
damages will not feel sympathy, and therefore are less likely to care about
what they are doing. This concern may be valid because sympathy does
appear to be an emotional trigger for taking matters more seriously.3" In
this respect, sympathy enhances legal decision making by acting as a natural
emotional signpost that points out: (1) the existence of a "justice-related
matter," (2) relevant facts that might be overlooked in a non-sympathetic
environment, or (3) the path towards the "just" outcome.365 Hence,
sympathy can help juries decide cases within the law by grabbing their
attention and highlighting the fact that someone has been hurt and may
deserve the juries' help. By putting aside evidence that might invoke
sympathy, bifurcation presents a risk that the jurors will lack the natural
stimulus to give the issues serious consideration.
The loss of the sympathy stimulus, however, does not mean that juries in
cases bifurcating liability and damages cannot or will not take their job
seriously. What it does mean is that judges who choose to bifurcate should
consider ways to substitute for sympathy's attention-grabbing function. For
example, in Beverly Hills the Sixth Circuit found that the notoriety of the
fire and the litigation was an adequate substitute.36 In Bendectin, the Sixth
Circuit found a sympathy substitute in the judge's instructions3 67 and the
plaintiffs' attorney's final argument.368 Where the circumstances require a
greater impression,369 the trial court might allow the plaintiff to present a
363. See id. One respected scholar has asserted that trifurcation "inevitably leads to the sterile trial of
technical issues related to causation divorced from the fact of the plaintiff's injury and a full account of
the defendant's role in the tragedy." Trangsrud, supra note 29, at 80.
364. SeeFeigensonsupranote56, at 29. Otherpotential benefits ofsympathy include stimulating the
jury to engage in more careful and deliberate decision making and allowing juries to make decisions
under conditions that are most familiar and natural. See id. at 37-38.
365. Id. at 29-34. Once the individual decides who needs and deserves help, sympathy then motivates
the individual to act. See id. at 36-37.
366. See In re Beverly Hills, 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982).
367. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
368. 857 F.2d at 316. The plaintiffs' attorney "told the jury that the trial was not an academic
exercise, and that the case involved many real people who soughtjustice, and who would, as children, be
affected by the jury's verdict well into the next century." Id.
369. Not everyone agrees that these are adequate substitutes. Professor Trangsrud, for example,
characterized the Sixth Circuit's reliance in the Bendectin case on the judge's instructions and the
attorneys' brief remarks as "incredible on its face." Trangsrud, supra note 29, at 81. However, Professor
Trangsrud was also referring to the fact that the trial judge excluded from the courtroom all children
under the age often and all visibly deformed plaintiffs regardless of age. See id.; see also Bendectin, 857
F.2d at 316 n.19.
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limited amount of injury evidence during the separated liability stage so the
jury can "begin to comprehend the significance of the claims to the
plaintiffs.""37 Trial judges and litigants can and will think of other means to
ensure that the jury appreciates the significance of the issues and takes its
role seriously.
In its more familiar sense, however, sympathy does not positively
influence jury behavior. While surprisingly little is known about the
sympathies juries bring into the jury box,37" ' the available evidence confirms
the longstanding suspicion that litigants who capture the jury's sympathy
during trial fare much better. In one recent study by Brian Bornstein, mock
jurors heard a claim by a woman against the large drug company that made
her birth control pills, alleging that the pills caused her to develop ovarian
cancer.372 Half of the participants were told that the cancer was detected
early enough that the woman lost only one ovary, could still have children,
and had an excellent prognosis with minimal chance of recurrence.373 The
other half of the participants were told that the cancer was detected late; as a
result, both ovaries were removed, she could no longer have children, and
her life expectancy was short because of a high risk the cancer would return
and spread.374 The mock jurors in the high-severity group reported increased
370. ComplexLitigation Project, supra note 130, at 122; see, e.g., McElroy v. Arkansas Log Homes,
Inc., No. 82-1642-C, 1989 WL 18755, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 13,1989) (rejecting, on motion for new trial
after court had tried causation separately, sterility argument because court allowed plaintiffs to develop
evidence of their physical symptoms and injuries and because "[p]laintiff's counsel effectively conveyed
to the jury the gravity of their decision").
371. Current research calls into question older notions of whether jurors are predisposed to like or
dislike plaintiffs or defendants generally. The belief that jurors are biased against corporate defendants,
for example, appears to be on the wane, see Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors'
Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 327,352 (1998) (arguing that increased liability
occurs not because jurors think corporations are evil but because they hold corporations to higher
standard ofjudgment and responsibility), while the view thatjurors dislike tort plaintiffs is on the rise,
see Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases:
Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & Soc'y Rev. 85 (1992) (finding many jurors
biased against plaintiffs because they feel that if same thing had happened to them they would not have
sued). Even background characteristics tell researchers little about what jurors think or how jurors will
decide a particular case. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and
Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 301,306,313
(1998) (arguing background characteristics such as age, gender, and race show only small association
with verdict preferences). Predictions based on jurors' self-reported attitudes fare better, but still fall far
short of the accuracy rates one might expect to obtain by knowing jurors' biases in advance. See id, at
313.
372 Bomstein, supra note 55, at 1481-82.
373. See id. at 1482.
374. See id.
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sympathy for the plaintiff and were almost twice as likely to find for the
plaintiff."5 An even more recent study used a mock automobile-negligence
trial to test the effect of injury severity on liability decisions.376 This study
also found that jurors considered the extent of the plaintiff's pain and
suffering in assessing the defendant's liability.377
Assuming that evidence of injury and damages is the engine for
generating sympathy, bifurcation is likely to limit the ability of litigants to
use damages evidence to boost their cases for liability. However, courts
should use bifurcation to avoid precisely this aspect of sympathy.3 78 First,
the increase in plaintiffs' verdicts associated with sympathy results from a
form of nullification in which juries ignore or alter the legally defined
standards for liability.3 79 As discussed previously, nullification is neither
within nor necessary to the jury's government-regulatory function.380
Second, altering legal outcomes based on sympathy is flawed policy
because sympathy sends too many false signals about who deserves help
and who is to blame. During trial, the jury can easily miscalculate the
sympathies of the case if the jurors do not realize that by helping a
particular plaintiff, they may hurt others who are not present. 38 , Even when
375. See id. at 1485. The participants filled out a questionnaire which asked them to determine
liability, estimate causation on a scale from 0 to 100, award compensation if they found the defendant
liable, and assign "sympathy" ratings for the plaintiff and defendant on a scale from -100 to +100. See
id. at 1483.
376. See Greene et al., supra note 246, at 679.
377. See id. at 689-70. The impact of sympathy in criminal trials has been extensively documented.
See Feigenson, supra note 56, at 20 & n.3 (collecting studies).
378. The very idea that courts should deny bifurcation to preserve prejudice is ironic, because the text
of Rule 42(b) calls for exactly the opposite result. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (authorizing courts to bifircate to
"avoid prejudice").
379. In the Bomstein study, for example, increased injury severity always increased sympathy, but it
only increased liability when the participants were in a position to compensate the injured parties.
Bomstein, supra note 55, at 1491-92. Since all of the groups heard the full evidence and were therefore
apprised of the full significance of the case, Bomstein concluded that the juries were not deciding
differently because they were paying better attention or taking theirjob more seriously, but rather were
deciding differently out of a desire to relieve the suffering of the plaintiff. Id. at 1492-93. Because the
conduct of the defendants was either factored out or held constant, the participants necessarily were
altering their liability standards based on sympathy. See id.
380. See supra notes 310-26 and accompanying text.
381. The classic example involves future suffering by absent victims, such as individuals who will be
deprived of affordable housing because of a jury's desire to alleviate present suffering through rent
control. See Feigenson, supra note 56, at 52-53 (discussing Judge Posner's economic analysis theory of
sympathy). In the tort context, one example might be the tendency ofjuries to find that certain drugs
have caused injuries. Thejury's desire to help the present victim by finding liability where none properly
lies creates future victims by depriving subsequent patients of a safe and effective drug. See, e.g.,
Henderson et al., supra note 9, at 1695-96 (noting that imposition of unwarranted liability on drug
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the plaintiff is unambiguously sympathetic, sympathy can still distort
liability judgments due to its tendency to shift blame from the plaintiff to
the defendant. 82 Third, sympathy seems ill-suited to the jury box because it
is an emotional tool designed to help people know when they should act, not
when others should act.383 The cost to an individual of volunteering aid is a
natural regulating force. Since juries do not "pay" the cost of the "help"
they give-the defendants pay that cost-sympathy is without its natural
brake.
In the end, the sterile-trial argument does not justify the presumption
against bifurcation (or, in this context, a presumption for unitary
proceedings). Bifurcation probably reduces the impact of sympathy injury
trials, and correspondingly reduces the frequency of sympathy verdicts.
That result, however, is more consistent with the proper role of the federal
civil jury and avoids the problem ofjuries disregarding the law or evidence
based on false signals of sympathy. Another effect of bifurcation might be
to reduce jurors' ability to appreciate the significance of the issues they are
deciding, and therefore reduce their natural incentive to decide the issues
with care and in earnest. The remedy to that risk, however, is not to erect a
barrier to bifurcation but to see that judges find other ways to ensure the
jury takes its job seriously.
IV. BIFURCATION AND THE QUEST FOR EFFICIENCY
One of the primary goals of Rule 42(b) is to promote efficiency.s
Indeed, while courts had long construed Rule 42(b) as authorizing
bifurcation for efficiency, the text was amended in 1966 to specifically
include "expedition and economy" as grounds for bifurcation.3 5 While
some people have lauded bifurcation as a means of cutting trial time,a"'
companies hurts society by discouraging prescription drug research and development). Butsee Vidmar,
supra note 220, at 870 (discussing study in which mock participants "fussed over the financial
consequences for the doctor and the doctor's practice at the same time that they expressed grief over a
severely retarded child and sympathy for its parents").
382. See Feigenson, supra note 56, at 59-60.
383. The point is simple but crucial: as an individual, one may help others simply because one feels
sorry for them, notwithstanding the fact that the person has no legal or moral blame for the other
people's suffering, and in spite of the fact that the help comes at a cost to the first person.
384. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see also In re Dow Coming, 211 B.R. 545, 583 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997)
("[J]udicial efficiency is a major objective of Rule 42(b).").
385. 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388, at 475.
386. See Mayers, supra note 9, at 389; Miner, supra note 26, at 1333; Schwartz, supra note 26, at
1206-07.
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others have argued that bifurcation will have no effect or the opposite
effect. 87 Currently, there is no conclusive answer as to which side is right.
This Article concludes, however, that the available evidence regarding
efficiency does not support the presumption against bifurcation. Rather, to
maximize efficiency, courts should aggressively look for opportunities to
bifurcate the ordinary cases that make up the bulk of the federal docket.
A. The Case for Efficiency
The efficiency of bifurcation in multi-plaintiff, complex litigation is
unquestioned. While this author is not aware of any empirical studies in this
area, the clear consensus is that bifurcation offers huge potential trial
savings in multi-plaintiff, complex litigation because the resolution of a
common issue can eliminate the need for hundreds or thousands of separate
trials to resolve individual issues. 88 The issue here, though, is whether
efficiency supports the presumption against bifurcation in ordinary single-
plaintiff cases. While this is a closer case,389 the available evidence indicates
that the presumption against bifurcation probably hinders judicial
efficiency.
The natural starting point is Zeisel and Callahan's 1960 study of
Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 21,390 which concluded that routine
bifurcation of liability and damages promised to cut trial time by
approximately 20%.'91 In rough terms, this reflected their conclusion that
the damages phase represents approximately 40% of most cases, and that
half of the cases would not need a damages trial because they would
terminate after the liability stage through either a defense verdict or
settlement.392 While Zeisel and Callahan's figures are limited by the scope
387. See Corboy, supra note 29, at 1016; Weinstein, supra note 29, at 847.
388. As the reporters of the Complex Litigation Project noted: "Given the difficulties and
inefficiencies of the present handling of complex litigation, even fervent supporters of the traditional
jury role have conceded that thejudicious use ofseparate trials is essential to the effective functioning of
the jury system." Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, at 123; see also Manual for Complex
Litigation § 21.632 (3d ed. 1995) (endorsing bifurcation in complex litigation to promote efficiency).
389. See Sanders, supra note 43, at 384 ("It is a closer question whether bifurcation can be justified
on the basis of efficiency and expedition in cases with single plaintiffs and single defendants.").
390. See supra note 75.
391. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1619.
392. See id. Zeisel and Callahan broke down their empirical data from two other angles, both ofwhich
yielded results consistent with a projected 20% savings. Id. at 1613-18.
Vol. 75:705, 2000
Bifurcation
of their study and possible selection effects,393 they provided early support
for the use of bifurcation to cut trial time.
A 1982 study of civil cases from Cook County, Illinois (which includes
Chicago) from 1959 to 1979 provides additional support.394 During that
time, the parties agreed to bifurcation in 979 cases (out of a sample of
roughly 13,000)."95 The average trial length of all cases during this period
was 6.325 days.396 The length of bifurcated trials was significantly shorter:
trials on liability only averaged 3.82 days, whereas trials on damages
averaged 3.27 days.397 Thus, trials that concluded after one phase would cut
trial time by as much as 48%.398
What about the fact that many cases will proceed to the second phase?
The study apparently did not track the length of bifurcated cases that
required trial of both issues. Assuming that the single issue cases were
representative, 3" however, it can be estimated that the trial length of
bifurcated cases requiring trial of both issues would be 7.09 days (3.82 days
+ 3.27 days). Based on this estimate, full trials of bifurcated cases may run
longer than the 6.325 days required to try the average unitary trial. Of
course, the efficiency potential of bifurcation lies in whether it results in
enough partial trials to offset any lengthening of the full trials, and here is
where the results of the Cook County study are most useful. Projecting from
the results of the study and the estimates drawn above, bifurcation is more
efficient if just 25% of bifurcated trials either result in a defense verdict or
393. The study did not have statistically significant samples to draw conclusions regarding the impact
of bifurcation on contract or other non-personal injury cases. See id. at 1610. In addition, the study is
subject to selectivity bias because the judges chose whether to bifurcate depending on the facts of the
case: some judges bifurcated frequently, while some judges bifurcated rarely or not at all. See id. at
1614; see generally Clermont& Eisenberg, supra note 221, at 588-92 (discussing selectivity effect);
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77
Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1173 (1992) (demonstrating that while studies showed judges found for plaintiffs
more than juries in medical-malpractice cases, this was not because juries were less sympathetic but
because parties sent stronger cases to judges). Zeisel and Callahan tried to factor out selectivity by using
the judges who shunned bifurcation as a control group and concluded that the results were not
significantly skewed by selection effects. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 12, at 1613-16.
394. See Priest, supra note 58, at 531 & n.27.
395. See id. at 553-54.
396. See id. at 554.
397. See id
398. A damages only trial that concluded without the liability phase would cut trial time by 48%:
3.27/6.325 = 0.52. A liability only trial that concluded without the damages phase (the most likely
scenario) would cut trial time by 40%: 3.82/6.325 = 0.60.
399. Ifanything, the cases in which the litigants chose to bifurcate are likely to be more complex, and
therefore would be expected to take longer to try. See id. at 554.
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precipitate a settlement after resolving the first issue.4°° If the case was
resolved after the liability verdict 40% of the time, the average length of a
bifurcated trial will be just 5.78 days, 40 ' a savings of 9%. If liability verdicts
lead to the dismissal or settlement of 60% of the cases, the savings increase
to 19%.402 As noted previously, defense verdicts on liability alone are likely
to resolve approximately half of the cases that reach trial, with post-liability
verdict settlements resolving even more. 3 Thus, this study supports the
hypothesis that, over time, it is more efficient to separate issues within a
case and try the second (and maybe the third) issue only when necessary.
B. Potential Offsets
The decrease in the time it takes to try cases is only part of the picture,
since any savings of trial time might be offset by changes to the courts' trial
dockets. The most significant potential offsetting consequence of
bifurcation is its effect on pretrial settlements.4 "4 As Professor Weinstein
astutely noted, any trial savings resulting from bifurcated trials would be
offset by even fractional reductions in pre-trial settlements.4 5 More
recently, law-and-economics scholars also have warned that bifurcation
might hinder pre-trial settlement by lowering overall litigation costs.406 The
lowered litigation costs could also offset trial savings by increasing the
400. At a 25% resolution rate, the average trial length would be 6.27 days [(3.82x 0.25) + (7.09x
0. 75)], versus 6.325 days for unitary trials. The precise break even point based on these figures would be
a 23.39% resolution rate, with the solution, n, to the following: 3.82n + 7.09(1-n) = 6.325.
401. At a 40% resolution rate, the average trial length would be 5.78 days [(3.82x 0.40) + (7.09x
0.6)], a savings of 0.545 days off the 6.325 days for a unitary trial. This equates to a savings of 9%
(0.545/6.325).
402. At a 60% resolution rate, the average trial length would be 5.13 days [(3.82 x 0.6) + (7.09 x
0.4)], a savings of 1.20 days off the 6.325 days for unitary trials, This equates to a savings of 19%
(1.20/6.325).
403. See supra notes 14-15.
404. Other previously feared offsetting inefficiencies, such as the risk of an increase in the frequency
of hung juries (thereby requiring duplicate trials) have been refited. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note
12, at 1623. Indeed, the Landsman study suggests the opposite effect. Landsman et al., supra note 7, at
322 tbl.5 (finding incidence of hung juries was three times greater in unitary trials than bifurcated trials).
405. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 850. Because only a small percentage of cases go to trial, a small
reduction in pre-trial settlements-with the coordinate increase in trials-will offset the savings of
having shorter trials.
406. Lowering litigation costs increases the overall value of the claim to plaintiffs while decreasing
the value of settlement for defendants, thus narrowing the range of mutually acceptable settlements. See
Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 251-53 (1994); Landes, supra note 279, at 115.
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number of cases filed in the first place.4 7 While the theoretical validity
underlying these concerns is not in doubt,40 8 they are not persuasive reasons
to shun bifurcation.
The economic models identify possible offsets but cannot predict the
likelihood or the magnitude of those offsets. For example, while the model
notes that a less expensive trial will reduce the incentive to settle, it does not
and cannot predict how large the offset will be, either in absolute terms or in
comparison to the savings from reduced trial time, because it cannot predict
the value of the underlying variables.40 9 Thus, the ultimate answer
necessarily lies in empirics, and the empirical evidence available does not
support the theory.410
The economic-model prediction that bifurcation might increase the
number of jury trials also fails to account for the impact of bifurcation on
liability verdicts. One of the law-and-economics arguments, for example, is
that the decreased litigation costs resulting from bifurcation will increase
407. See Baird et al., supra note 406, at 252; Landes, supra note 279, at 114-15.
408. More precisely, this Article does not question that the economic models are mathematically
accurate. Like all law-and-economics theories, however, these models are only as prescriptively accurate
as the assumption that litigants are unwaveringly rational actors, an assumption that no longer appears
capable of support. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law andBehavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumptionfrom Law and Economics Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
409. See Landes, supra note 279, at 114-15 ("[Ihe net effect of bifurcation on the aggregate cost of
litigation is unclear."). The economic model simply cannot estimate either the size of the cost savings
from bifurcation or the number of cases where the cost savings will push the parties outside their
settlement range. Specifically, if bifurcation saves each side $5000 in trial costs, it will impair
settlements only in those cases where the parties' settlement ranges overlap by more than $1 but less
than $10,000. Moreover, for purposes of comparing the savings with the offsets, the economic model
cannot estimate how many bifurcated cases will end after the first phase or how large the savings will be
from not having to try the second phase.
Baird and his co-authors also argue that bifurcation creates an incentive for parties to withhold the
information needed for the litigants to reach realistic conclusions about the value of the plaintiffs'
claims. Baird et al., supra note 406, at 252-59. As a result, Baird suggests that however large the
settlement-gap group is in unitary trials, it will be larger in bifurcated trials, therefore decreasing the
frequency of settlements and increasing the risk of offsetting inefficiencies. Id. at 259. Here too, this
author does not question the general theory of the economic model. However, it is questionable whether
it applies to bifurcation in federal courts because it assumes that parties have the ability to withhold
information about the value of their lawsuits from their adversaries. See, e.g., id ("A low-damage victim
has an incentive to mimic the high-damage victim, because high-damage victims receive large settlement
offers after they prevail during the liability trial."). Some of this no doubt occurs, but the discovery rules
provide ample basis for litigants in federal courts to obtain damages discovery.
410. In the Zeisel and Callahan study, the pre-trial settlement rate was identical during the two years
before and after the Northern District of Illinois implemented Local Rule 21. Zeisel & Callahan, supra
note 12, at 1623. The theoretical conclusion that bifurcation creates a disincentive to settle is also
inconsistent with the experiences of most federal judges, 85% of whom reported that bifurcation
expedited settlements in their courts. See Harris Poll, supra note 39, at 745 tbl.5.6.
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case filings by making the average case more profitable for plaintiffs.4"'
Among those increased case filings will be cases that are weak on the legal
merits. To the extent bifurcation punishes weak cases by limiting
compromise verdicts," 2 however, bifurcation may more than offset the
financial incentive to bring weak cases created by decreased litigation
costs." 3 In addition, the fact that bifurcation (at least in tort cases) appears
to yield fewer liability verdicts with higher damages could also increase
settlements by closing the settlement gap. 4 Finally, any bifurcation effects
on settlement and filings might offset each other. If bifurcation reduces the
incentive for defendants to settle, for example, it will create a corresponding
disincentive for litigants to bring the weaker cases in the first place because,
absent the prospect of settlement, those weaker cases are doomed to failure
at trial.4 5
In summary, the potential for offsetting inefficiencies is a valid concern,
but one that depends on numerous incalculable variables and that stands or
falls on the accuracy of its assumptions. In contrast, the available empirical
411. The profitability of a case is equal to its expected value less litigation costs. See, e.g., Baird et al.,
supra note 406, at 252 (calculating profitability of case based on expected value and litigation costs).
The expected value of a case is equal to the expected damages awarded discounted by the likelihood of
winning. To illustrate, assume a plaintiff estimates that he or she has a40% chance of winning $100,000,
for an expected value of $40,000. That case is ex ante profitable if he or she estimates litigation costs to
be $25,000, but is unprofitable if he or she estimates litigation costs to be $50,000.
412. See supra notes 220-40 and accompanying text.
413. See Complex Litigation Project, supra note 130, at 110. ("Plaintiffs are somewhat less likely to
bring nuisance suits when the defendant's liability is doubtful because they will not be able to invoke
jury sympathy with evidence of their damages until liability is determined.")
414. Both plaintiffs and defendants could view bifurcation as disadvantageous if the plaintiffs fear a
total loss and the defendants fear a largejudgment. In that case, increased bifurcation should increase the
likelihood of settlement because defendants will offer more and plaintiffs will accept less. A more likely
effect is that bifurcation will not alter settlement frequency but will drive down the price by making trial
less attractive to plaintiffs but more attractive to defendants. According to Kahneman and Tversky, risk
tolerance depends on whether the person perceives the outcome to be a loss or a gain. Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263,268- 69
(1979). In general, people will prefer a certain but small gain to an uncertain larger gain, but will prefer
an uncertain large loss to a certain smaller loss. See id. In the context of litigation, that means that
plaintiffs have an increased desire to settle to achieve the certain gain, but defendants have a decreased
desire to settle and pay a certain loss. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of
Litigation, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 113, 144-46 (1996). Bifurcation would exacerbate both desires. Plaintiffs
would have an even greater urge to settle because the risk of a take-nothing verdict would increase;
defendants would have an even greater urge to go to trial because the chance of paying nothing
increases. Ultimately, though, this would only decrease settlement price, because the reduction in
defendants' offering price would be met by a corresponding reduction in plaintiff's asking price.
415. See Robert Cooter& Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 412 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that reduction
in settlements in bifurcated cases would create disincentive for plaintiffs to file low-probability cases).
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evidence shows that bifurcated trials are shorter overall and do not cause
offsetting inefficiencies. On balance, the evidence falls far short of showing
that bifurcated trials are presumptively inefficient compared to unitary
trials. If anything, the casefor efficiency is stronger, and therefore warrants
the present conclusion that, in the long run, an increase in bifurcation will
promote trial efficiency. Accordingly, the presumption against bifurcation
cannot be sustained as a rule of efficiency.
C. Maximizing Efficiency
If the current presumption against bifurcation is inefficient, what is the
best replacement? One alternative might be to bifurcate every issue (at least
to the constitutional limits). However, common sense alone dictates that a
non-discretionary rule would be extremely inefficient. In some cases,
bifurcation of any kind will be inefficient.4"6 Even where some bifurcation
would be efficient, courts must draw the line where to stop separating
issues. In an ordinary tort case, for example, it might be perfectly efficient
to bifurcate liability and damages but inefficient to try the elements of
liability separately.41 7 Thus, the most efficient usage of bifurcation must fall
somewhere between the current presumption against bifurcation and
absolute issue separation.
Federal judges are in the best position to determine how much more
bifurcation would maximize efficiency. First, it seems unlikely that either
empirical studies or economic models will be able to prescribe a standard or
formula for determining maximum bifurcation efficiency. The multitude
and nature of variables inherent in each bifurcation decision defy
experimental duplication, empirical measurement, and mathematical
416. A one-day trial, for example, stands to gain little from issue bifurcation of any kind based on
administrative hassle alone.
417. Professor Woolley makes substantially this point in discussing the constitutional implications of
overlapping evidence when separate juries are used. See Woolley, supra note 154, at 533. The repetition
of evidence required when one jury decides general causation but another jury decides comparative
negligence or proximate causation is much more likely to be an efficiency problem than a re-
examination problem. See id ("It is not re-examination per se that is troublesome, but its consequences,
which may include.., the burdening of litigants or the court system."). While overlapping evidence may
make trying issues within liability inefficient in single-plaintiff cases, efficiency almost always dictates
bifurcating issues within liability in class-action mass-tort cases: "[]f the court approves bifurcation in
the face of crossover issues, the parties in essence trade the risk of repetition should the plaintiffs win the
class trial for the end of litigation and significantly reduced costs should the defendants win the class
trial." Id. at 534.
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prediction. Second, Rule 42(b) is and always has been a rule of discretion.4,8
Thus, any studies or models can only offer generalizations that help test
existing practices and suggest new uses, but cannot prescribe rules. Third,
federal judges have demonstrated their ability to make efficiency-related
bifurcation decisions in the areas of patent litigation and complex
419litigation.
4t
The judge's decision ordinarily should depend on how much evidence
overlaps the separated issues. Judges should not limit bifurcation to those
cases where they think the defendant is likely to prevail on the separated
issue.42° Such a practice is underinclusive, because many cases will settle
after the jury finds for the plaintiff in the first phase.42' Judges also should
not limit bifurcation to cases where the damages evidence predominates.
Judges have been conditioned to think of bifurcation efficiencies in terms of
the weeks, months or even years that can be saved in mass-tort cases with
thousands of individual plaintiffs. In ordinary cases, however, the savings
from bifurcation will register in days.422 The existing evidence suggests that,
consistently achieved, these smaller savings can and will add up over time,
perhaps to as much as a 20% savings in trial time overall.423
If evidence overlap is the crux of bifurcating for efficiency, then how
does the court know when the evidence overlaps too much? Courts should
not reject bifurcation when they detect any overlap.424 Instead, courts must
418. The trial judge's decision whether to bifurcate issues is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 8
Moore's Federal Practice, supra note I, § 42.20(5)(b); 9 Federal Practice andProcedure, supra note 2,
§ 2388, at 481-82.
419. See supra notes 19, 122-26 and accompanying text.
420. In one personal-injury case, for example, the district judge stated that "[b]ifurcation will
normally only shorten the total length of a trial if the defendantprevails on the question of liability and
thereby renders a trial on damages unnecessary" and denied bifurcation of liability and damages because
the defendant had not "demonstrated that its probability of prevailing in a separate trial of liability [was]
sufficiently substantial to warrant ordering a bifurcated trial ... on the basis of'judicial economy."' Fetz
v. E & L Truck Rental Co., 670 F. Supp. 261,266 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
421. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. One colleague astutely suggested that this result
could be further enhanced by a provision like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provision that required
offers of settlement between the phases, with Rule 68-like penalties where good offers are rejected. Cf
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (requiring plaintiffwho rejects an offer ofjudgment in excess of ultimate recovery to
pay the defendant's post-offer costs). While such a device is beyond the scope of this paper, the idea
merits additional thought.
422. See supra notes 388-402 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 388-402 and accompanying text.
424. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 1202-03.
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compare the likely overlap with the potential savings.4" Naturally, parties
who feel disadvantaged by bifurcation have an incentive to exaggerate the
expected overlap of evidence, while parties who feel advantaged by
bifurcation will have a corresponding incentive to understate the expected
overlap of evidence. Therefore, judges must use their experience to assess
the likelihood of overlap independently. When the same jury is used, as it
almost always will be, the party claiming overlap should need to explain
why the evidence must be repeated in its entirety.426 The judge must also be
mindful of inconveniencing repeat witnesses by probing into the need for
the proffered testimony.427 Perhaps improvements in courtroom technology,
such as videoconferencing for witnesses, will provide a suitable solution as
well.
428
V. ALTERING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST BIFURCATION IN
ORDINARY CASES
The presumption against bifurcation in ordinary cases is unjustified.
First, neither the Seventh Amendment nor the Erie doctrine oppose the
increased use of bifurcation of ordinary cases.429 Second, the longstanding
policy objections that bifurcation creates a sterile, pro-defendant
atmosphere and is antithetical to civil jury practice do not survive
425. In an ordinary single-plaintiff, products-liability case, for example, bifurcating liability and
damages may create little evidence overlap, but separating causation from proximate causation or
comparative negligence would create substantial evidence overlap. While that type of bifurcation is
nevertheless efficient in multi-plaintiffcases, it is less likely to be efficient in single-plaintiff cases. See
Woolley, supra note 154, at 533-34. The judge must consider each case on its facts; trifurcation as
discussed above might still be efficient if general causation required only a day or two of testimony but
proximate causation or comparative negligence would be substantially longer.
426. See, e.g., Witherbee v. Honeywell, Inc., 151 F.RD. 27,29 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding duplicative
testimony unnecessary where same jury is used); Buseemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1272
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same). This Article addresses bifurcation of ordinary cases, not month-long ordeals. If
a party has a witness testify to events in phase one on Monday, there is no reason the witness would need
to duplicate that testimony in its entirety in phase two on Thursday. While a lawyer may say the witness
will repeat testimony in fill when opposing bifurcation, the lawyer may feel differently during trial,
knowing that the jury may not appreciate having its jury duty unnecessarily lengthened by needless
repeat testimony. This is particularly true if the judge is telling the lawyer to "move on."
427. In an article titled Bifurcated Trials: How to Avoid Them-How to Win Them, the authors
expressly instruct lawyers to fight bifurcation by finding ways to call witnesses who can testify to
multiple parts of the trial. Curry & Snider, supra note 219, at 48-49.
428. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial
City, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1516 (1998) (speculating how technology might affect trial practice).
429. See supra Part II.
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scrutiny.43 Third, the presumption against bifurcation in ordinary cases is
inefficient. The available evidence strongly suggests that courts could
substantially reduce overall trial time by aggressively looking for
bifurcation opportunities in ordinary cases.43 '
Rather than default to a presumption, judges should independently assess
whether there are issues they could try separately to promote efficiency.432
The parties, of course, will remain free to file motions or make suggestions,
but the courts should neither rely on the litigants to raise the issue nor
accept their assessments at face value because the parties' perceptions of
bifurcation may be biased by perceived strategic advantages or
disadvantages. In many cases, efficiency will call for some variant of
bifurcation. While the most obvious candidate for efficiency will be to
bifurcate liability and damages, courts should consider carving at other
joints within the case if those joints are better suited for carving. As Judge
Posner explained, "[t]he judge can bifurcate (or for that matter trifurcate, or
slice even more finely) a case at whatever point will minimize the overlap
in evidence between the segmented phases or otherwise promote economy
and accuracy in adjudication.''433
Prejudice remains an important, but in many ways secondary, concern
under Rule 42(b). As used in Rule 42(b), "prejudice" means the risk that the
jury will improperly use evidence from one part of the trial to decide a
different part of the trial.434 Bifurcation relieves prejudice rather than causes
it, so prejudice should not stand in the way of bifurcating cases for
efficiency. Conversely, the risk of prejudice could warrant bifurcation even
where it would be inefficient. In those situations, the trial judge will need to
determine whether the risk of prejudice is so great as to justify an
inefficient bifurcation rather than the traditional use of curative jury
430. See supra Part III.
431. See supra Part IV.
432. Federal judges already have the power to bifurcate under Rule 42(b) sua sponte. See S Moore's
Federal Practice, supra note 1, § 42.20(5)(a); 9 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 2388,
at 483.
433. Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1995). This case also
provides a useful discussion of creative severance. The trial judge bifurcated the plaintiff's breach-of-
contract claim between liability and damages, but included the fact of injury in the liability portion of the
trial. See id. at 889. While that division is appropriate in tort cases, where the fact of injury is an element
of liability, it was inappropriate in the contract setting, since the jury could have found a breach but also
found-as it appeared to have done there-that the breach caused no damage. See id. at 891.
434. See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
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instructions.435 Where efficiency scales are relatively even, a valid showing
of prejudice by either party should warrant bifurcation.
Some change to Rule 42(b) is needed before federal judges will
aggressively consider which of their cases are good candidates for
bifurcation. As written, Rule 42(b) is already broad enough to support the
aggressive bifurcation this Article advocates. For sixty years, however,
federal courts have not bifurcated to the full extent authorized by Rule
42(b), and this trend is not likely to change on its own.436 In addition, the
1966 Advisory Committee's Note endorses bifurcation "where experience
has demonstrated its worth," but otherwise instructs that "the separation of
issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered."437 While not binding
statements of the law, the Advisory Committee's Notes are "akin to a
'legislative history' of the rules" and often are given considerable weight by
the courts.43 Whether the 1966 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 42(b)
was intended to be neutral or to create a presumption against bifurcation no
longer matters: in practice, federal courts have consistently cited this
language in support of a presumption against bifurcation in ordinary
cases. 439 Ultimately, the key to achieving increased bifurcation is to change
judges' attitudes about how they apply their discretion." Given the history
435. See supra note 362 and accompanying text. The nature and degree of the risk of prejudice may
make this choice a difficult one for the judge given the questionable efficacy of curative jury
instructions. As one commentator stated: "As far as [limiting] instructions are concerned, there is not a
single study anywhere, good or bad, that shows that such instruction does a bit of good. In fact, it may
do harm." Panel One: What EmpiricalResearch Tells Us, and What We Need to KnowAbout Juries and
the Quest for Impartiality, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 547, 562 (1991) (reporting statement of Dr. Norbert L.
Kerr, Professor of Psychology, Michigan State University); see also Jeffrey T. Frederick, The
Psychology of the American Jury 275 (1987) ("Mhe burden has shifted to those who maintain that
judicial instructions are an effective remedy for possible prejudicial events or information to demonstrate
the parameters of effectiveness of such instructions.").
436. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, requests to bifurcate increased, but the success rate of these
requests plummeted. See Landsman et al., supra note 7, at 305.
437. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) advisory committee's note.
438. 4 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 2, § 1029, at 124; see also Mississippi Pub'g Co.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,444 (1946) (noting that Advisory Committee's construction of federal rules
is "of weight"); see, e.g., Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1998) (relying on Advisory
committee's notes to Rule 50 to show that deficiency in evidence must be brought to opposing party's
attention prior to close of evidence to give opposing party chance to cure deficiency).
439. See, e.g., Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir. 1978); Brown v. Advantage
Eng'g, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1163, 1170 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
440. Professor Mayers presciently stated in 1938 that bifurcation would never catch on until the
lawyers and the judges let go of the belief that unitary trials were the right and just way of trying civil
cases. Mayers, supra note 9, at 396-97.
Washington Law Review
of bifurcation in the federal courts, it may take a textual amendment to Rule
42(b) to change the way the federal judges perceive bifurcation.
The changes to Rule 42(b) should not be dramatic, however. First, the
existing text of Rule 42(b) already contains all of the tools needed to do the
job properly: it is discretionary, it already references convenience,
prejudice, and efficiency, and it pays direct homage to the Seventh
Amendment. Second, Rule 42(b) applies also to separation of claims."4
Thus, any changes to the existing text would either require separate
treatment of separation of issues-making the rule more complex and
cumbersome-or would risk unintended consequences on the trial ofjoined
claims. Accordingly, the changes should leave the text of the existing Rule
42(b) intact while communicating the need for judges to more aggressively
consider whether bifurcation would further the goals stated by the existing
Rule 42(b) criteria.
This Article proposes an amendment to Rule 42(b) by adding a sentence
at the end of the existing text stating that the court should independently
consider in each case, without presumption, whether a unitary or bifurcated
trial better serves the goals expressed in the preceding sentence. The
Advisory Committee's Note accompanying the amendment should reinforce
several themes. First, the note should confirm that the decision to conduct a
unitary or bifurcated trial should be made independently, without
predisposition, based on the court's analysis of efficiency and the risk of
prejudice. Second, the note should specify that bifurcation is not unfair or
antithetical to the values served by the civil jury. Third, the note should
instruct courts to look aggressively for issues in each case which, if tried
separately, offer the potential for a shorter, more efficient trial. While
liability and damages should be a candidate in every case, courts should not
bifurcate liability and damages reflexively, nor should they erect blinders to
other forms of bifurcation. Fourth, the note should explain that prejudice to
a litigant may not be sufficient to support an inefficient bifurcation, but
ordinarily should be dispositive in situations where a unitary trial and a
bifurcated trial are comparably efficient.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rule 42(b) authorizes federal courts to separate issues for trial. This
procedure holds great promise for increasing efficiency by eliminating
unnecessary trial time. Although there is no conclusive data on how much
441. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
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trial time bifurcation will save, the available evidence suggests that
aggressive bifurcation of liability and damages alone could yield savings of
as much as 20%.
The same case for efficiency could have been made forty years ago. In
fact it was. At that time, however, neither the bench nor the bar were ready
for such a drastic change in the way federal courts try cases. Many critics
complained that bifurcation undermined the role of the civil jury. The critics
pointed to studies showing that plaintiffs in personal injury cases won much
less often when the jury decided liability and damages separately. The
critics acknowledged that this decrease in plaintiff victories reflected the
loss of sympathy verdicts and compromise verdicts, but argued that such
jury behavior was one of the values of the civil jury itself-the ability of
laypersons to use their common sense and community values to temper
harsh legal rules. The critics prevailed" 2 and thus was born a rule-based
presumption against bifurcation that has been in place ever since.
The time has come to resume the bifurcation debate and bring it to center
stage. The case for efficiency has not changed; indeed, it appears to be as
strong as ever. What has changed is the receptivity of the bench and bar to a
more aggressive approach to bifurcation. Bifurcation has become more
common as the incidence of complex cases has risen. Thus, bifurcation has
become more familiar to those who staff and patronize the federal courts. In
addition, the trend toward managerial judges has gradually changed
attitudes regarding innovative procedures. Thus, judges and lawyers are
more likely to welcome the aggressive approach to bifurcation than they did
in the early 1960s.
This is not just a case of a procedure whose time has come in terms of
audience receptivity. Rather, new work in the field ofjury decision making
tends to dispel many of the feared harmful side effects of bifurcation. First,
recent empirical studies suggest that bifurcation is a double-edged sword
that can reduce liability verdicts but might also increase damages awards.
Thus, bifurcation should not be cast aside as a boon to defendants. Second,
the development of the story model of jury decision making supports
bifurcation as a procedure that promises to enhance, rather than harm, jury
decision making.
The bifurcation debate has existed for almost as long as Rule 42(b) itself.
While the bifurcation debate has lingered at the fringe of procedural reform
442. As one commentator put it, the bifurcation movement of the 1960s was beaten back by
"tradition" and a "fondness for the intricacies ofcompromise verdicts." Maloney, supra note 77, at 112-
13.
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generally, forty years have passed since the legal community directly and
comprehensively addressed the validity and utility of the presumption
against bifurcation. During those forty years, the nature of federal court
dispute resolution has changed, as has the understanding of how juries
decide cases. Thus, the presumption against bifurcation stands in need of a
contemporary evaluation. This Article does not presume to resolve
conclusively the many issues that underlie the debate. Others no doubt will
see issues that this Article does not address. Still others will see the issues
this Article does address in a far different light. This Article merely offers
one view in the hope that it will revive the debate for everyone.
